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I
INTRODUCTION

TIME AND THE ANTITHESIS BETWEEN THOUGHT
AND REALITY

1
1. The Greeks, not sparing even thought itself from their
insatiable questionings, posed the problem, " How can we
seek for knowledge which we do not already possess? "
Human thinking, whose alleged function is to illuminate all
other problems, is itself the most baffling enigma. For, if
we stop to examine this commonplace experience of thinking,
it enmeshes us in logical tangles so abstruse that they beggar
both science and philosophy. No wonder, then, that modern
psychology, so eminently successful in measuring intelligence,
is yet unable to decide what intelligence is. This but verifies
a familiar observation made by Poincare to the effect .that
the familiar things in life are the most surprising and mysterious. Then let the logicians be unashamed of the inscrutable syllogism, which seems to shed light on all things by
means of the dubious device of keeping all the darkness within
itself. But this inner canker of darkness becomes apparent
when we cease to think about things and think about thought;
and as James inferred, it is the cause which keeps the neverstopping clock of metaphysics going.

4

The Concept of Duration

The human mind, because the human heart is Platonic,
will not cease striving for its unattainable ideal. We
seek knowledge whose clarity is perfect; but before we can
make assured progress in this direction, we must first of all
put an end to thinking about thought. Epistemology is the
inevitable cul de sac of our hope of attaining perfect knowledge. Poincare somewhere observes that science, far from
overcoming the complexities of nature, only transfers them
to the textbooks. This is but the parallel in science of a
similar tour de force in philosophy: We move from victory
to victory in the realm of thought about things only at the
cost of multiplying defects in the sphere of thought about
thought. It would be unnecessary to repeat here the numberless self-contradictions which beset formal logic and higher
mathematics at their best. Kant and Hegel, Bergson and
Schiller have made their familiarity banal in its intensity.
The reality of these self-defects in the theory of knowledge,
however, overshadows any other vice they exhibit, if indeed,
they are vices at all. That the human mind is almost invariably led to believe that antitheses in knowledge must be vices,
is attested by the fact that the attempt to remedy such antitheses has brought about the main schools of thought of the
present, whether pragmatic, idealistic, or realistic. In
science, the advent of relativism essentially means the advent
of logical devices to remedy the logical deadlocks of the
Newtonian system.
2. It is the central aim of this thesis to examine the intricate factors which condition this inevitable cloud-gathering
called ' epistemology.' We may distinguish two fundamental
accounts which the human mind is inclined to give regarding
the discrepancy between the perfect theory of knowledge for
which we seek, and the circular results which we always
achieve. (1) There is first the view that the obdurate selfcontradictions of our ways of knowing are inevitable and
unavoidable. This is the case, for instance, in Bergson's
belief in an ever-growing reality which must always burst
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the measures to which we would confine it. This view, in its
radical form, is always dualistic or pluralistic. It regards
the chasm between thought and reality, between the measured and the measuring, as evidence of a primal and incurable
rift in the nature of existence itself. Our universe, it holds,
is a dual and unstable one, sharing our struggle for existence.
There exists in the essence of things, the irrational, the
chaotic. Reality is woven of two irreducible opposites, which
we meet in our experience as the opposition of truth to error,
good to evil, and beauty to ugliness. We can find no common
denominator to which these forces may be reduced, simply
because none exists. In the last analysis, evil, ugliness, and
error are not to be understood but to be fought; we seek to
understand them only that we may strike. Yet, despite this
dualism of theory, it leads to a curious monism of practice:
Our warfare against this triune of foes will be effective to
the degree that we do understand them; and when our enmity
against them is at its best, we live as if they could be fully
understood! Thus, in science, we act as if nature were conserved; while with Alchemists' hearts we yearn to violate
her 'givenness.' Nevertheiless, this 'intentional' positing
of an absolute order is here at least made a pre-condition of
thinking, not thought's goal. There is indeed a far cry between accepting the 'uniformity' and rationality of nature
as the guide to thought, and in accepting them in advance as
thought's assured goal.
The second solution is by far the favorite one. It assumes
that nature embodies an ' absolute order ' of things, whether
in terms of the ' uniformity of phenomena ' posited by science,
or in terms of the ' rational ground ' posited by the Hegelian
idealists. According to this view, nature is such that our
knowledge ought in time to exhaust it. According to this
account there are two ways of interpreting our present (and
historicaily, omnipresent) difficulty of a logic which fails to
lock-step with reality. We may insist that the true logic
must be uni-modal, having but one set of postulates, and a
47
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unitary technique. At present, this outlook is abandoned in
favor of another device: the attempt to encompass reality,
not by perfecting one instrument, but rather by multiplying
instruments. This is an age, not of logic, but of logics. In
imitation of current mathematics, with its plurality of geometries, we tend to accept a plurality of logics. Witness
Russell's distinction of 'transitive' from 'intransitive' judgments,· and the erection of special logics to deal with the
latter form. Today, truth, whether in geometry or logic, can
only mean the consistent use of one set of postulates.
Curiously, the ability to choose the right logic for the right
problem, or a geometry of just the right number of dimensions, becomes a matter of brute' cunning' in Samuel Butler's
sense. But, this sort of thought, which really solves a problem, is left outside of both logic and geometry. The right
geometry once selected, thought dies - the routine processes
of geometry represent thought in the act of becoming habit.
To be sure, these 'habits' are acquired at the expense of
thought, but in regard to the questions: " how do new geometries evolve," the manuals of geometry are notoriously silent.
We must never, in any case, confuse this latter view with
the dualistic or pluralistic one first mentioned. This age of
many geometries and many logics is hardly even pluralistic
in its epistemology, and perhaps never is in its ontology.
That is, though we have in addition to the geometry of Euclid,
the geometries of Riemann and Lobachevski, all three of them
have physical situations corresponding to them. However
Einstein emphasizes the relativity of physical states, he still
accepts the state of light as an absolute, which binds all relative states into a unitary system. Symbolic logic does not
' oust ' traditional logic but accepts it as one out of a coordinate set of logics. These ' epistemological ' pluralists differ
fundamentally from the ontological pluralists. Though the
ontological pluralist may also multiply methods even more
radically, by adding intuition to reason, metaphor to formula,
48
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they do so only to approximate reality, not to come to literal
grips with it.
3. The history of logic, seen in perspective, appears as a
struggle between the opposed convinctions mentioned above.
Perhaps the opposition is one of temperament rather than of
reason. Our choice of one or the other may be fundamentally
a moral choice. For instance, the demand for an absolutely
'given' knowledge practically results in our digging for
'more' knowledge than we have. Perhaps the Bergsonian
despair that nature is inexhaustible means practically that we
must be content with what knowledge we have already. Only,
Bergson can retort that the notion of an absolute knowledge
leads us to the illusion that we have it already.
A dear ideal of knowledge awoke in the breasts of the
ancient Greeks, and the struggle to attain this ideal forms
the central theme which unites the history of science and the
history of philosophy into one drama. Our ideal knowledge
must have two traits: (1) it must be 'exact' and (2) it
must be exhaustively true to reality. Knowledge becomes
exact as it approaches the mathematical ideal. All sciences,
born of philosophy, slowly and steadily approach the mathematical norm. Astronomy and physics are thought to have
made the nearest ' approach ' to it. But, never has Zeno's
paradox of Achilles and the tortoise found so grim a verification. In truth, we are in a more hapless plight than was
Achilles. Achilles, so some accounts have it, meets defeat at
the hands of infinity- the infinite subdivisibility of the path
over which he runs. Now, the human mind in its struggle
for the exhaustively true and completely exact, has two infinites to conquer: for both truth and exactness, though
posited as fixed goals, turn out to be ideals, ever receding
from our approach. We have not actually achieved such
knowledge; but this difficulty, great enough in view of the
tremendous price we pay for every advance of knowledge, is
a trifle in comparison with a greater difficulty, namely; that
we cannot even think such an attainment. The attempt to
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conceive of absolute knowledge brings on logical deadlock,
which takes the form of the following dilemma: Mathematical formulae and logical inferences become exact just to
the extent that they become alienated from reality. Hence
Russell's humorous slander of mathematics as the one science
in which we never know what we are talking about! To
encompass reality, our knowledge must surrender its pretense to exactness. The history of thought exhibits the
human mind grasping first one, then the other horn of this
dilemma.
The ancient Greeks contrasted sense knowledge with
rational knowledge; and accepted rational knowledge as embodying the loved ideals, exactness, and truth. The Sophists
achieve the first revolt, insisting that sense knowledge is in
touch with the realities and that it gives us no absolute.
Socrates and Aristotle restore the repute of rational ideals;
and Medievalism perpetuates it. But with the Schoolmen,
the exactness of syllogistic knowledge is portrayed with such
vigor that this very exactness itself begins to look like an
inexaustible source of novel exactness! The Schoolmen also
exhibited the forlorn isolation of rational knowledge from
reality. Then, with the advent of empirical science during
the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, the pendulum of
opinion swings to the other extreme. Sense knowledge, in the
guise of scientific induction, again wins because of its inherent capacity to grapple with the 'realities' of the external
world; but only to lose again because of its inherent inability
to give absolute knowledge.
With Kant we get a new formulation of the problem which
has had scant parallel in preceding times. Kant, so to speak,
accepts this pendular nature of thought as natural. To him,
knowledge has two forms; there is ' pure reason ' opposed to
'practical reason.' Pure reason is always relative, and cannot attain the absolute because it cannot surmount the antinomies. Practical reason alone can attain the absolute.
50
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With Hegel, a renewed endeavor to achieve the rational
ideal presents itself, whose essential features are so unique
that history is even more empty of parallel than in the case
of Kant. Hegel, noting the inherent self-contradictoriness of
knowledge, attempts to solve the difficulty by the unique device of treating this self-contradictoriness as logically necessary. The alternative, that contradiction may originate, not
in knowing but in the nature of the world known, is excluded
by that other device of idealism, to regard nature too as an
idea. The universe, according to Hegel's treatment, becomes
a universe of thought, evolving according to the logical necessities of ' thesis ' and ' antithesis.'
To the writer, at least, the undying greatness and significance of Hegel lies in his full grasp of the predicament o~
epistemology. He saw, not only that the disease of self-contradictoriness is· the one invariable factor which brings about
the defeat of epistemologists; but (and this is his great resemblance to Kant), he accepts this contradictoriness as incurable. He is unique only in his device of treating the antitheses of thought as logically necessary steps of one process.
He is the great Stoic of epistemology, making a virtue out of
a difficulty. If only we could banish the suspicion that Hegel
sought to banish difficulties by treating them as the chief
symptom of clarity.
The predecessors of Hegel found an insoluble opposition
between the objectivity of induction and the exactness of deduction. Deductive reasoning is exact enough, but we are
not sure that it is true to the realities, i.e., that it is objective.
Hegel objectifies thought, but forthwith sacrifices its exactness. For, if thought is by nature antithetical, thought is by
nature unable to find absolute knowledge, i.e., it can never
put an end to its own processes, since every synthesis but
anticipates a new antithesis. Hegel's successors, Fichte and
Schelling, exhibit the eternal opposition of Hegel's 'thesis'
and ' antithesis ' in terms of the oppositions of the ' self ' to
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the 'not-self.' Precisely as in science, we have accumulating
instances, but no absolute rule about the number of instances
it takes to validate a generalization. If there is no absolute
end to the succession of theses and antitheses, Hegel believes
that we can at least assert that thought is absolutely antithetfoal: our one absolute truth regards thought itself, not
things thought about. But we dispute the claim that thought
is inherently antithetical. We cannot assume that because
thought has always turned out to be antithetical in the past,
that this must always be the case. It is again the reality of
time, the possibility of finding a final ' synthesis' that stands
in the way of Hegel's unique attempt to achieve a present
absolute knowledge, namely, that thought is eternally antithetical.
In brief, Hegel apparently discerned that it is the timefulness of reality which renders it opaque to thought; and accordingly seeks to conquer that timefulness by embodying it in
the nature of thought. Time has indeed been the great point
de resistance in nature. Only the devastations and changes
wrought by the destroyer time have blocked our attempt to
erect a system of order where thought and things have a oneto-one relation. To others, Hegel's method will appear like
that of a wise general, who sees clearly that one and only
one achievement can assure the conquest of absolute knowledge. Thought can only hope to absorb nature by conquering
its strongest citadel, the reality of time.
4. The significance of time to the problem of knowledge,
whether in science or philosophy, is at present in the forefront of speculation. After the advent of instrumentalism
in science, and the explicit attack on the concept of time in
physical relativism; after Bergson's vindication of time, and
the pervasive attention which this concept gets in the writings
of both realists and idealists of the present, we can have no
<loubt but that the logical oppositions between schools of
thought can be almost completely stated in terms of their
respective orientations to the problem of time. Plato ob-
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served 1 that time is unworthy of the solicitude of immortal
beings; because in the realm of perfection, the transitory is
a matter of indifference. Only, we are beginning to suspect
that we are not immortal beings; and that, in the language
fo Anaximander, 2 we too must atone for our "offense against
the order of time."
5. It is the aim of this thesis to develop the view that
there is a mode of thinking which implicitly embodies time
within it, namely, the imagination. Imagination is the intermediary between formal reasoning and the reality it seeks to
portray; that imagination at once partakes of the nature of
thought and deed. I show that in imagination, rightly conceived, we have a generic mode of thought, suitable to all
problems, artistic, moral, intellectual. But, because imagination has a multiplicity of problems, it has a multiplicity of
ways of dealing with them. And, because these problems
are opposed, the devices employed to solve them will be
opposed also. So that, if we isolate the routine processes of
thought, and erect them into logics, each with its own postulates, we have on our hands a double predicament. First,
these logics will be mutually contradictory. Hence Aristotle's
opposition of the active versus the passive reason, St.
Anselm's opposition of faith to reason, Kant's opposition of
pure to practical reason, Bergson's opposition of intellect to
intuition. Second, will be the discrepancy between reality
and each special system which we set up. But, if we view
our special logics in terms of their generic origin out of
imagination, will their opposition cease?
This is but to ask again, whether the dualist's view that
reality bears within itself a clashing of forces which goes to
its very depth is right or wrong. If it is right, then oppositions must always appear in thought so long as it is ' about '
the whole of reality. And the author, with due regard to
1
2

Herbert Nichols, The Psychology of Time, N. Y., 1891, p. 1.
Zeller, Pre,-Socratic Philosophy, Vol. 1, p. 256.
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the declaration made by William James that in matters so
obscure, we are all beggars, accepts the dualist's view. We
can cover this our essential beggardom by an exhibition of
plentiful and fairly clear details regarding more superficial
matters. These, the author hopes, the reader will find in the
essentially psychological and scientific (and perhaps also
logical) analyses of the thought processes to be found in the
following chapters. The epistemological issues mentioned in
this introduction are but feeble threads holding together
chapters of a much more empirical kind.

II
MEASURED AND MEASURING TIME

1
MATHEMATICAL TIME VERSUS DURATION

6. If the system of formal logic furnishes its own epistemology, then its concepts must be taken just as they represent
themselves; that is, as wholly timeless. But this is just the
dilemma which the theory of knowledge must overcome;
namely, the difficulty of how concepts bereft of time can be
knowledge of a timeful object, or knowledge to a subject who
never escapes time's omnipresence. This problem may be
approached from the standpoint of psychology: for the concept is a product of thought, and examination may show that
the static property of concepts may be only 'intentional' in
Brentano's sense; or that knowledge, as the Critical Realists
say, is only 'affirmed,' or is 'transitive' in nature. A possible way out of the difficulty of timeless knowledge which
still represents a timeful reality is indicated by the argument
that chronological time is itself a concept, which ' stands for •
timelessness, but which is itself the product of a maturation
or development in time.
If man is indeed the measure of all things we should expect
that back of the inert symbolism of numbers there is a wealth
of growing meaning which really exhibits creative activity at
54
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high rather than at low tide. On the other hand, numbers
represent the universe as all lifeless and dissected; yet the
mathematical mode of thought seems to exhibit creative
thinking at its best. There is a mode of thinking, the imagination, which like experience itself, is in the nature of a
<lream, with vital history in all its phases. But with the socalled 'higher' modes of thought, as exhibited in the special
procedures of logic, mathematics, and in moral reflection,
this timefulness seems to vanish. But we believe that consideration of certain psychological data will show that this
timefulness has not vanished, but is only disguised. Is it
possible to discover in the symbols of mathematics and logic
the clear evidence of a maturation or development in time of
which concepts are the fruit? Before answering this question, it is necessary to specify the exact sense of the word
time which we consider an indispensable principle in the
interpretation of the facts of the reasoning process.
7. Let us distinguish at the outset a mathematical and a
psychological concept of time. Mathematical time is distinguished by its mathematical properties, but in opposition
to it we may describe a concept of time for which there is no
very satisfactory current designation. It is variously termed
'subjective' time, the 'measured' time, 'psychological'
time, or 'duration.' The last term is perhaps the most suitable because Bergson has given to it the connotation we wish
to emphasize. The full meaning of this theory of time will
appear when it is contrasted with its opposite, which is the
mathematical conception of time. After stating these
theories in their fullest opposition, we will seek to determine
the bearing of experimental facts upon them. Thirdly, we
ought to determine by logical analysis the categories proper
to each of them. Last of all we ought to indicate certain
properties of time that have escaped both experimentation
and logical analysis. For the innermost savor of the experience of time utterly escapes both instrumental and logical
an.'.!.lysis. Its most vital reality escapes all technique save the
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technique of our deeds. It is not improbable that the notion
of a numbering time derives its intelligibility from the fact
that numbers themselves are psychogenetic rather than
transcendental in their meaning. H. B. Alexander has shown
the futility of the attempt to impart meaning to numbers
without going beyond them. 1 Such attempts, according to his
argument, result either in a purely nominalistic mathematic
or a mathematic whose realism is that of a world transcending
ours. In either case number remains in as much need of
explanation as before. It is the invention of counting, he
maintains, and the " psychology of number consciousness " 2
that give meaning to numbers. "As for mathematics," he
adds, " its arithmetic is au fond the digits of our limbs, its
geometry their motions." 3
But deeds, one may object, are not as such philosophical they do not constitute knowledge, until they are given an intelligible voice. We shall see whether the dynamism of deeds
is not the key to the psychological meaning of number. Besides, deeds have moral and aesthetic aspects in which we
may find the continuity and the discontinuity of the clock's
time reconciled. It is first necessary that we examine closely
the two opposing conceptions of time which we have mentioned, in order to be assured that we have not created a
fictitious problem for ourselves.
2
THE PROPERTIES OF MATHEMATICAL TIME AND
THE PROPERTIES OF DURATION

8. Scientists and laymen alike entertain a certain duality
of motive which leads them to employ, in their daily affairs,
at least, both the mathematical and the durational concept of
1 H. B. Alexander, "The Definition of Number," The Monist, Vol.
XXV, 1915. Also in Nature and Human Nature, Chicago, 1923, Chap.
IX.
2 Op. Cit., p. 352.
3 Op. Cit., p. 356.
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time. The simple experience of drinking a cup of tea will
exhibit this fact. If eager for the drink, the time taken by
the lump of sugar to dissolve ' seems long ' to us, while the
succeeding period of satiation seems short. Meanwhile,
however, the placid clock may have doled but an equal time
for each moment of the act. Yet, spite of the fact that the
dial contradicts experience, to think of time as a rate of
motion over a dial is a deep-seated habit of every man who
is synchronized to the routines of civilization; and because
of this habit we speak of the time of the clock as ' real ' and
our inner experience of time as only ' seeming.' We treat
time as a quantity all for the commercial and social advantages of doling it out in unit quantities,. as for the buying
and selling of labor, or for the sake of any other of our
Eocial cooperations. Nevertheless, if we give heed we shall
see that the 'seeming' delay or haste of our subjective experience is probably just as important a factor in our lives
as is the clock's mechanical rate. We do not note the paradox
of the contradiction in our twofold view until we boldly
attempt to treat all time as exclusively the time of the clock.
We somehow are not pursuaded when told that a period of
insufferable waiting ' lasted but a moment ' according to the
time of the clock. To be sure, if we depended on our inner
sense of time alone ·our cooperative life would be thrown in
hopeless turmoil. From the point of view of chronometry
our inner sense of time is arbitrary and lawless.
There are prevailing, therefore, two views of time. There
is a ' measured ' time and a ' measuring ' time. In daily
experience, when we are free from the sophistication of
metaphysics, a n~ysterious synthesis seems to come about between them. Metaphysically, the practical harmony between
chronometrical time and time as duration, becomes a paradox.
There is danger of making this paradox an insoluable one.
We are subject to the inveterate intellectual habit which
tempts us to solve this problem by treating either mathematical time or time as duration as alone ' real.' We try to
57
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make mathematical time an ontologically exhaustive account
of time, but this results in making an identity where there is
a difference.
The attempt to make the mathematical concept of time do
service for all phases of the experience of time generally
takes the form of identifying time as a dimension, coordinate
with the other dimensions of space. The school of relativists
in physics, make use of such a simplification of time, which
has been made possible largely because of the work of Minkowski. To Minkowiski, time is a ' fourth ' dimension; but
if we examine the logic by which he achieves such an identity,
we have not far to seek for the artificial forcing of two distinct meanings under the caption of one term. Mathematical
time is claimed to be representable by the properties of a line.
Now, at the very start, we must distinguish between the real
lines of space and the abstract and conceptual lines of science.
Real lines are indeed no more than trajectories or paths, and
the familiar dial of a clock is able to pass muster as a measure
of time because it is eloquent with the sugg:estions of a
journey. And a journey is indifferently gauged in either
units of time or space. For example, if you are one mile from
home and in good health, you are also about twenty minutes
from there. The clock is able to serve as our social standard
because its real rate strikes an average to which we are
synchronized by our biological history: its days journey is
our days journey. The unit distances of the dial of a clock
represent certain basic lapses of experience which we choose
to regard as mensurating intervals. So far, indeed, we are
not yet beyond subjective time at all. Like subjective time,
the journey of the clock's hand is continuous. That is, its
transition along its pathway is such that it is impossible to
state in numerical terms its progress at any given instant.
No matter how small an instant we choose, so long as it has
a beginning and an end, the actual position of the hand between them is problematical. Mathematics deals only with
the countable, hence to subject time to mathematical treat58
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ment, its flow must be rendered discrete. To this end, time
i5', considered, not as sharing the properties of real time but
of a purely conceptual one, wholly fictitious so far as direct
experience is concerned.
9. The inroad of the discrete notion of time is plainly
evident in the fact, that although we begin by equating so
much space for so much time, in practice this resolves itself
in considering only the end points of such distances as representing time. For example, the rotating earth and the moving
hands of the clock are typical time instruments of science,
But w.hen the frequency of the clock's revolutions are adjusted
to the revolutions of the earth, we are free to ignore entirely
the real distances traversed by each. Instead, we merely
count the successive recurrences of their motion. When the
clock is so regulated that it makes two revolutions while the
earth makes one, we disregard the actual distances traversed
by each, and measure time merely by counting the revolutions
of the hands. Now, a number as such' is no specific magnitude: it may stand for any magnitude whatever. Accordingly,
this time of number is free from the suggestion of either a
real space traversed or of a real time consumed in doing so.
We are now dealing with mathematical time proper. It has
unique properties which distinguish it at once from the immediate, subjective time pf experience, or the time of journeying represented by distances. The time of the clock is a fusion
of the notion of mathematical time and of time as duration.
Time as duration and the clock's time are alike at least in
two important respects: both are continuous, and the occurrence of each is unique - unique in the sense that they occur
but once. To be sure, we count each ' new ' rotation of the
clock's hands, as only a repetition; but this is one of the
characteristic conventions of mathematics. The uniformity
of the clock's motion, the equality of its hours, depend on the
seeming fact that the clock does not profit from its experiences. Nevertheless, it endures in time in the sense that it
progressively 'forgets' the form given it by its maker. Its
59
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iime is the time of dissolution, yet just as real, ontologically
speaking, as our time of progression and growth. Now the
clock's time conceived above, is not yet suited to the needs of
mathematics. For this, we require a concept of time which
must at least fulfill three requirements: ( 1) Time must consist of unit intervals subject to the operation of counting.
(2) These units must be quantitatively equal so that any
unit of time whatever its location in the series of time units,
will be equal in value to any other time unit of its class. ( 3)
The order of succession of these units must be subject to reversal and repetition.
.
These conditions once fulfilled, we have made the thinking
of time in numbers possible; and this achievement marks the
very apex of intellectual triumph. This potency of numbers
is by far easier to employ in practice than to understand in
principle. Indeed, could we unravel the mystery of their
power we should be very near to the secret of all knowing.
We shall find this problem challenging us in later chapters.
Suffice it for our present purposes to ask whether it is possible to ascribe this triune of properties of . mathematical
time to time as we live it? To even a casual inspection it
would seem that the properties of mathematical time mentioned above but rival each other in doing violence to our
experience of time. The time we li_ve is first of all continuous, and this is violated by all three of the properties of
mathematical time. The third one might be mistaken as an
exception. It does not seem to specifically deny succession to
time, but only assumes any given series of time units as repeatable. But it is precisely this assumption, that all repetitions of a time interval are equal, which denies that any
given occurrence of time is real. This belies experience, for
here, nothing is real that is not particular. Real events, like
real objects, are individual: nature does not supply any deeired number of repetitions of them free of charge. Only
that affluent nature in which the intellect makes its home is
so generous. Unhappily, the scientist lives in both realms at
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once. So far as his laboratory problems, i.e., his intellectual
problems are concerned, the scientist may well repeat an
' afternoon ' of mathematical time so often as he chooses. All
that is required is to set back the hands of the clock or to
set the pendulum swinging anew. Meanwhile, however, he
must endure a real time which occurs but once. The time he
may waste in mistakes cannot be recovered so magically.
10. In short, the mathematical conception of time is intellectually useful but ontologically false: lived time is ontologically real, but useless in intellectual operations. And we
are confronted again by the master enigma of our thesis: how
can mathematical time be useful if it is not also ~mtologically
true? In attempting to answer this question, we can proceed
with some hope of success only so long as we remember that
the problem is not solved by denying ' reality ' to either of
the concepts of time which are involved. Of course, no
quarrel ever arises between immediate experience and the
notions that it finds useful. Epistemology does not arise in
the case in hand until we raise experience to the conceptual
level. Then follows the question, how can we reconcile its
property of continuity with the discontinuity of mathematical
time which measures it?
We shall avoid the attempt to explain both of the concepts
of time with which we are dealing in terms of the logic of
one of them taken alone. The logic of mathematics surely
is not adequate to the explanation of a problem which it has
not created. This means that mathematics, which cannot
proceed at all without the materials of discrete steps, will
never be able to explain the continuous. Accordingly the
attempt in mathematics to define a sort of discrete continuum
is futile. In mathematics, it is the custom to distinguish between discrete, dense, and continuous classes. The discrete
class owes its distinctiveness to the fact that it satisfies
Dedekind's postulate, which requires that an element of a
discrete class divide it into sub-classes. .A::. dense class is defined as one in which any two elements will always have a
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third element between them. A familiar example of a dense
class is the class of points forming a line. No matter how
close together two of its points may be, other points nevertheless exist between them. A continuous class is defined as
a dense class but which also satisfies Dedekind's postulate.
That is, it must be a class between whose elements other
elements always occur to infinity, yet in which any particular
element will divide the whole class into two distinct subclasses. Such a series will at once be dense and discrete; and
the classic example given of it is again the class of points
forming a line.
Now if this conception were inviolable it would mark no
Rmall victory for mathematics: it will mean that the antagonistic notions of the continuous and the discrete have found
a reconciliation. The discrete will be fused with the continuous without the sacrifice of its discreteness, and Zeno's
paradoxes would be at an end. Unfortunately, when we inspect this notion of a continuous class we find that instead of
solving the paradox it only conceals it, and in rather ill disguise. Consider the line which is supposed to exemplify the
idea of the continuous class. It manages to appear at once
as continuous and discrete by virtue of a certain kindly office
of its points which take upon themselves the whole brunt of
this miracle. When we choose to look for the property of
discontinuity in our line, some of its points are required by
the definition to hold themselves together by an inner force;
and they thus serve as static nodal elements among the remaining points which continue in a perpetual welter of falling
asunder into more and more points. In other words, we have
here two radically different classes of points. Our mathematical continuum gets its validity because we employ in its
construction certain points which are not mathematical points
at all. On the contrary, they lw,ve a concrete existence by
virtue of the very fact tlw,t they resist division. Their space
for once is ' real ' because it does not collapse into an infinity
of infinitesimal spaces. Now, the difference between such
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indivisible points and the infinitely divisible kind is just as
great as the difference between. mathematical and durational
time which we have all the time been trying to reconcile. How
can mathematical and durational time be parts of the same
experience? This is truly the same qquestion as to ask,
" How can the infinitely divisible points of the dense class,
and the indivisible points which define the discrete class cooperate with each other in producing the ' same ' line? So
far, mathematicians are not beyond sheer affirmation that
they in fact do unite to form a continuum.
11. But now we are out of the realm of speculation and
find ourselves again in the realms of deeds and movements.
The hands of the clock makes its continuous journey along
its path, and yet its progress can be measured step-wise.
Here there is no opposition between the continuous and the
discrete. Return once more to reflection: the mathematical
continuum at once bristles with the inherent hostility between
unity and multiplicity. Strange to say, we cannot traverse
a conceptual path even in thought. That is, we cannot traverse the infinitely divisible points of this continuum because for every point traversed another one springs into
existence at our feet. The indivisible points can be traversed,
but here we never know that we make progress. In either
case, we are left in a logical deadlock.
Thus, science sets out in its customary way to explain the
unknown by the known; which it regards at once as the
process of explaining the complex by the simple. But what
is simple to experience is not simple to the intellect. Now, in
experience, a pathway is indeed a simple image of time, but
to scientific reflection this same pathway becomes the embodiment of bristling difficulties. Then, since we must solve the
problem of time reflectively, we must turn to other forms of
conscious experience for aid besides logical definition. Now,
in volition and aesthetic experience, unity and multiplicity,
coherence and divisibility loose the bald opposition they have
so far exhibited. Stated in other and more crucial terms,
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the fundamental difference between the time of science and
the time of experience is that science regards the unique as
inconsequential; whereas we must expect the unique in the
time we live. The very reversibility of the clock and the uniformity of its time are due to its inability to profit from experience, as it were. A clock that should ' learn ' its task
the better from day to day would become useless for our purposes. Indeed, in this case it would have certain purposes of
its own, otherwise, ' learning ' has no meaning. The time of
the clock is uniform because it does not have a time of waiting. It has no occasion either for delay or haste since it has
no past from which it can profit. On the other hand, duration
is real because it involves a real history and a real evolution.
That is, it involves the striving for specific goals.
3
TIME AND ITS PREDICATES

12. Just as science seeks to represent time by the simple
image of a line, so it describes time by a single predicate:
the category of the relative. Relativity might be termed the
'black sheep' of the categories, for the association between
relativism and scepticism has been most persistent in the
history of thought from the day of Heraclitus with his universe of pure change. The notion of the unreality of time isthe natural counterpart of the view that time is wholly relative to the human point of view. Now, the relative, as far as
thought is concerned, is just as real as the absolute. Even if
it were shown that time is purely relative, that is, purely
' appearance,' ontologically considered, it is still real. And
curiously enough, the ' appearances ' which the philosopher
and scientist would disdain, somehow get themselves talked
about far more than do the eternal verities that are supposed
to crowd the appearances out of existence. What the relativists must mean, then, when they call time unreal is that
time conceived as an absolute is unreal, i.e., is not verified by
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experience. If time is so completely relative that all of its
characteristics can be represented as one dimension, then it
is at least as real as the other three. In fine, the issue is
solely to decide whether time is real in the sense that lines
are real, or whether it possesses a sort of reality unknown to
lines. Now, the lines of mathematics have only a conceptual
existence. They are composed of an infinity of discontinuous
points. Such lines are never met with in real experience.
The lines which we experience are real paths, and it is possible to traverse them. But the points of the conceptual line
can never be traversed. For no matter how many of them
we scale, always an infinity of them still lies before us. But,
no doubt, we really endure time, and consign it to our past.
Hence, if time is to be considered a dimension, it cannot possibly be the dimension which is defined in mathematics.
13. By relative we mean to indicate the dependence of the
meaning of anything in comparison with something else.
Explanation by comparison requires that the terms of this
comparison have a common denominator. For example, time
and space are alike in their point successions, says the devotee
of Einstein. Time and space are relative in this case because
both are explained by our reliance on a third or middle concept, the concept of point. It will develop that this sort of
definition is always definition by denotation; and its logic
can be completely rendered in Euler diagrams. The category
of the relative is therefore confined to the quantitative aspect
of experience: it does not touch quality. It may be said that
surely qualities are comparable in terms of their intensity,
but reflection will show that in every idea of intensity there
is hidden at once, as Bergson declared, the implication of
space. The term qualitative intensity illegimately embodies
two contradictory ideas.
14. What must be the necessary meaning of the word absolute? If it is not to encroach on the meaning of the word
relative, this term must mean the signification of a thing as
depending on itself alone. As Bergson has it, a thing is ab65
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solute by being absolutely what it is. It is at once obvious
that this term is misapplied when we speak of absolute space.
Space itself is none other than the field of 'anyness' where
relations are found: this is its actual service to science. The
points of space may be anywhere, and actually are nowhere
until they are given a locus by a relation. The sum total of
the points which we have charted forms a space which is
purely relative. Yet, there is a sense in which space is qualitative and absolute, and that is the space which we actually
traverse. We cannot say that a single atom or the whole
universe of atoms is absolute because this involves the definition of a quantity in terms of itself, and this is meaningless.
We would be no wiser if a tradesman were to tell us that a
lump of butter is equal to itself in weight, it is necessary to
define it in terms of other measures such as pounds, and
ounces. But there is a sense in which all quantities are absolute. Relatively speaking, a pound of butter is neither much
or little. Its quantity can become an absolute only when the
butter is lifted by someone. Its weight for each person that
lifts it will be absolute: it will be absolutely the amount of
effort it calls forth. Effort and the experience of time alone
are undivided and this alone forbids relations. It will be objected that successive intervals of time may be related and
compared, but such comparisons are always made of time
which is already flown and quantified. When we declare that
a certain period of time was 'short,' we still find that during
this time our state of attention was intense: on the other
hand, a period of time which seemed 'long' is a period of.
waiting. Our judgments of ' long ' and ' ~hort' are therefore
derived from the degree of tension of the mental state during
which the time passed. But here we take advantage of a dual
signification of the term intensity, and it is necessary to rescue
this term from equivocation. It has misled psychological
labors because it implies at once the ideas of quality and
quantity. It has thus been illegimately employed as a means
of measuring qualitative experience, a goal that has long
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been dear, not to Weber and Fechner alone, but to scientists
•of all ages too enamoured of mathematics for the good of
psychology. There is in every sensation a reflection of the
extensity which we must meet, but we meet this extensity
with effort, which is more than so much quantity. The uniformity of the limens of psychophysics are therefore wholly
deceptive. Time and effort, in a relative sense, have no experiential meaning.
15. In Newtonian physics time is considered in the sense
of an eternal and uniform flow. In the literature of modern
physical relativism, it is common to refer to the Newtonian
conception as the "relativism of Newton," to distinguish it
from the "relativism of Einstein." The relativism of Newton is supposed to result from the inference that since time
is uniform in its flow, its actual rate, like the actual extent
of distances, is negligible. This form of relativism is supposed to be distinct from Einstein's in that the latter considers the flow of time as relative to bodies, while Newton
considered the flow of time as independent of bodies. Examination will show that the difference is a verbal orie.
Underlying both conceptions is the notion that time is a literal
flow, like that of water. Now, it is only a verbal difference
whether we say that this flow is relative to bodies, as does
Einstein, or that the motion •Of bodies is ·relative to the flow
of time, as does Newton. A relation holds in either of its
senses. If once we say, as does Newton, that time is absolute,
we cannot then say that its absolute rate does not matter.
Newton's time should be described as relatively absolute, and
it would so be not one whit different from the time of Einstein which is absolutely relative. Both descriptions, as De
Morgan would perhaps say, go beyond all serious paradox,
and conceptually belong to the class of " round squares "
and "square circles." Clerk Maxwell is the author of the
paradox which holds that should all bodies receive at the
same time blows that would increase their motions by proportionate amounts, the change would go undiscovered by us.
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Poincare has invented a similar paradox in which it is argued
that should the universe expand and contract its dimensions
uniformly, man would not be able to discover it. In either
case, the reason why the change goes undiscovered is because
they are supposed to occur instantaneously, that is, the change
from the one state to the other does not consume any time.
And if it consumes no time it robs us of no effort. Now, these
accounts derive their whole force as paradoxes from the fact
that we cannot believe that space and time should be expanded
and contracted without our being alive to the change. But if
it is supposed that we ourselves have changed in a manner
which leaves us adapted to the new world as to the old, then
indeed no change at all has occurred. The paradox arises
because we imagine that we have endured the change, but
still retain in memory a knowledge of the smaller world which
we just left. But in this case, there will be one thing, memory,
which still belongs to the world before the miracle happened.
In other words, we are talking about a change which makes
no difference. Now, such a change is no change at all.
16. The most fruitful lesson to be learned from all this is
that the actual content of our concepts is far richer than we
think. Here is a gap between our ideas and our ideas of our
ideas. There is a difference between the idea of space which
we really hold and the definition .we give to it. We define
distances in terms of the unit distances comprising them, but
lurking in our minds is the notion of the effort it will require
to traverse it. In exact science, distances are understood in
the first sense, and are expressed by numbers. Thus, there
is saved from reality only its numerical aspect. So long as
numbers are regarded as symbols of pure quantity, those
quantities may be increased and decreased without affecting
our thinking so long as the increases and decreases are proportional. Hence the accuracy of maps. As geographers,
the difference in size between the map and the area it represents is very nearly negligible. Not quite negligible, because
however minute the map, its various points will still have to
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be traversed when we gauge distances upon it, and hence
will occasion a loss of time. As mathematicians, however,
we reach the apex of the power of thought, for now distances
are represented by figures, and these may represent any distance we please. Numbers come very near being shorn of all
suggestion of time and labor. But, if we enquire into the
inner meaning of numbers, we shall see that they too imply
a history. Our map and our scale of miles are temporary
devices, for the reason that the making of schemata is not
the whole of life. As wayfarers, every distance is what it
is in spite of our lordly habit of replacing it by a number in
our calculations. In practice, we are bound to consider distances in terms of the efforts required to traverse them. The
scale of miles we make as geographers will• show the same
number of units that we shall find in traveling, but in traveling we must do far more than merely count them. Counting,
however, means some effort, and this accounts for the ability
of numbers to form in miniature a substitute for experience.
The convenient scale of miles which we store in memory has
the one disadvantage that when the time for action arrives
we must recall how much effort each number stands for.
Each number must have restored to it, to the very end of
the journey, the full measure of intension of which it was
robbed for the sake of computation. This full measure must
be returned in a varying proportion of intensification of effort
and of extension of time.
16. In the last analysis, the image of a line has served for
the idea of time with such success because the line is prolific
in its suggestion of a pathway, a distant goal, and all of the
toil and chance of human wayfaring. Indeed, science chose
far better than it knew, for this drab image of the line is rich
with reminiscence of life with its infinity of points striving
haplessly at continuity; and the line eloquently bespeaks a
certain characteristic of time as lived, namely, the defeats
encountered along the pilgrimage and the dissolution of death.
These faltering points, spinning themselves out infinitely in
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bootless endeavor at progress, are indeed but the images of
our own footsteps. The notion of a dead atom driven by blind
forces was intended by science to transcend the human point
of view; but both have betrayed their human derivation. The
atom turns out to be a miniature chaldron of weltering forces;
and as for the forces themselves, they are but counterfeits of
the human will. We even suppose that physical forces follow
the path of least resistance, as though they were obliged, like
human strength, to economize in order to keep from perishing.
Newton would represent the universe as existing without
cost. But every fact of life, beginning with the chlorophyll
of the plants, ever engaged in saving sunlight from being
eternally lost in the form of heat, shows what is really going
on in Newton's vain universe of silent stuff, maintaining an
unchallenged reign over a realm of limitless space. Existence
is not unchallenged, but hangs on a strand woven of will and
thought. " No thinking without phosphorous," says the
materialist: " No phosphorous without thought," answers
the idealist. Both statements are true, and they portray creative imagination, the very essence of life, moving in a universe whose sole bread is the lump of necessity leavened with
a little spice of freedom.
17. Thus, we might justify the precepts of Protagoras at
length. Ideas which clarify our thought turn out to be fancied
duplicates of our selves, whose pantomime performances we
watch like so many avid crystal-gazers, waiting for a revelation of fate. And crystal-gazing and thinking are alike in
that the visions attained in each are in reality but the foreshadowings from hidden recesses within our souls. It is
miracle enough to learn the process by which such inner acts
can clothe themselves in borrowed garb. But the greatest
miracle of all is the reverence in which we hold these ideal
people we have ourselves created. The perennial freshness
of Plato, I imagine, lies largely in his simple and beautiful
faith that ideas hail from a sacred transcendental realm. Man
may create Gods in their own images, but they are Gods
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nevertheless, and here we come upon a characteristic of
thought concerning which neither experimentation or logical
analysis will give us further wisdom. Primally, thought
points not solely at truth, but at goodness; and this property
is one which addresses itself, not to our reason, but to conscience.
4
THE GOOD MAN AS MEASURE

18. The intellect moves by preference in a punctiform
space. But this space yet has one trait which the intellect
fain' would banish. The trait is the infinite extension of
space and the infinite divisibility of its points. At bottom,
even space is not given once for all. Now this very fluidity
of the concept of space, which permits points to be anywhere
indicates the existence of a conquering will which would
mould reality into an exact image of its purposes. The very
notion of abstract space is a superb scheme permitting the
greatest range to the creative imagination, for in it, any configuration may occupy any position. So also, Minkowski's
time, far from being given once for all, is as infinitely elastic
as the points of its trajectory are infinite in number. The
infinite subdivisibility of space-time is the conceptual symbol
representing the infinite pbssibilities which a higher tension
of life might find in any moment. Dimensionless points and
instantaneous instants are surds to reason, but not to our
wills, and again we arrive at the result: the inert is explained by the living. Fundamentally, then, the rule "man is
the measure " does not arise out of any ontological necessity,
but rather out of a teleological condition. Onthologically, we
may satisfy the intellect by positing a space of limited points
given once and for all, but we do so at the cost of a certain
spiritual surrender. Such a space becomes lucidity to reason
at the cost of becoming a prison to the creative aspects of our
nature. We instinctively reason from experience to formal
knowledge because experience brings certain truths to us
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which formal knowledge excludes. Like an instinct, our
thought moves not out of blind response to forces from behind, but because of desired ideal goals that lie ahead. Were
we shorn of all capacity save that of an effortless mathematical contemplation, we could for once countenance the
perfect lucidity of materialism. But so long as we contain
the germ of idealization, the lucidity of materialism is all
madness. And our rebellion is supported by history. Materialism has ever been the excuse of gross hedonism for its
weakness, of cowards for their failure, of tyrants for their
cruelty. The view that men are machines is far less an error
of logic than it is an error of disloyalty to the hope of ·life.
This hope comprises the common-sense of mankind by which
Descartes, rationalist though he was, sought to be guided.
Any theory of life which humanity consistently refuses to
accept is subject to suspicion for error. The entire history
of philosophy is monument to the fact that pure dialectic,
however tireless and subtle, has failed to disturb the na'ive
thought stubborn conviction of mankind that. men have freedom in time; and this in spite of the fact that in the
academic occupations of Minkowski space has unceremoniously swallowed up everything else.
To understand the meaning of time in its fulness, we need
to transcend the point of view of •facts and inferences. We
are bound to reality by other ties than by the ties of logical
consistency. We are bound by ties of loyalty to forces in the
universe which expect of us another sort of consistency.
"We grant that life is mean," exclaimed Emerson, " but how
did we find out that it is mean?" Indeed, how is meanness
ever to be understood except through the impulse to right it?
Now, to make possible a life of active loyalty it is necessary
to have a conception of the universe in which we may feel
"volitionally at home," as James expressed it. We demand
a universe in whkh there will be completely satisfied our inexorable sense that we possess creative powers which must
be loyal to other creative powers beyond. But such a uni-
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verse is flatly denied by our modern physical cosmologists
who assert that not only the quantity of the universe is given
once and for all, but that the time succession of its states is
rigidly fixed.
My argument but repeats an ancient belief of Saint Anselm
to the effect that we have a faculty within us which believes
first and then understands. In this it is unlike the intellect
which understands first and then believes. Our freedom, for
example, certainly rests, largely if not entirely, on our conviction that we have it. It is a commonplace of every-day
life that responsibility has to be taught. This issue, mechan~
ism versus vitalism, does not rest entirely on demonstrations
of fact: it is an issue whose truth is made either the one way
or the other. The doctrine of Minkowski that time is a fourth
dimension creates an utterly alien world for a normally endowed human being. Now, this is because the vital part of
this ' normal endowment ' consists of the healthy conviction
that we are free moral agents. The deterministic cosmology,
so popular in the classroom becomes from this point of view
the world of the madman who is dominated by the fixed idea
that his every thought and act is forced upon him. Is it
possible that we possess two faculties of understanding, one
suited to the formally rational pursuits of the class-room, the
other suited to the demands of the life of moral achievement?
This is the central theme of the following chapter.

III
TYPES OF LOGIC IN RELATION TO THE CONCEPT OF TIME

1
FORMS OF UNDERSTANDING

19. Our problem has considerably altered its dimensions.
We began with the ambition to discover how a reputed timeless knowledge could portray an experience so replete with
the savor of time. But now this project, so baldly and
meagerly stated, is set in broader measures. For an enquiry
into the nature of time has shown that bare concept, whether
73

32

The Concept of Duration

of time as dimension or time as continuum, borrowing its
meaningfulness from three very intimate experiences,
namely: purposive pursuit of some moral or aesthetic value,
toil of pursuing, risk of failure.
In short, we are face to face with the possibility that the
timefulness of experience is nowhere so intensive as in the
processes of our thinking; for it is just here that the vision
of goals, the labor of creation, and the risks of defeat are at
their height. But the formal or intellectual mode of reasoning deals only with identities existing between existential
elements; therefore, the desireful, creative, and risk-bearing
phases of thought remain inexplicable in its terms. They are
intelligible only to another faculty of understanding, a faculty
which is exercised by our moral natures. This, at any rate, is
the thesis of our present chapter.
20. Historically, the revolt against Hegelianism marks the
reassertion of the belief that the intellect is but part of a
larger human understanding. This belief points at once to
a principle of method, namely: that since our complete reason is moulded on an external reality, the lineaments of the
latter may be to some extent inferred from the bare fact that
some things are thinkable and others are not so. A profound
consequence attaches to this; namely that epistemology contributes to the content of ontology. That is, the nature of
our thinking reveals the nature of the world which we think
about. Hegelianism makes a dangerous use of this principle
simply because it considers formal reasoning as the only reasoning of which we are capable.1 When, therefore, it infers
a monism of being from its forced monis mof knowledge it
deceives itseif about reality only because it has already done
violence to human nature.
1 Professor Bosanquet, the bearer of the Hegelian intellectual tradition, seeks to regard even willing as an ideational process. In his
Psychology of the Moral Self, (p. 79 ff.). he attempts to interpret an
act of decision as " more like that of being absorbed in an idea than
like that of giving effect to desire . . . "
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21. However, if we begin by examining our mode of understanding we shall see that understanding makes use, not of
one tool, but of several. Human minds have, not one form of
understanding, they have at least three of them. St. Anselm
was rightly led to infer that goodness and fact are so diverse
in their natures that they must be attained by totally different
logics. Yet, a most persistent attempt to make the one form
of thought swallow the others has been a main ambition of
philosophers since Plato. Plato was a monist in the sense
that he regarded all reality as ideal in nature. But we must
beware of confusing Plato's concept of the idea with that of
certain modern schools. His ideas were at once forms and
values; 2 and in this Plato implicitly recognizes the duality of
fact and value for which we here plead. Fact and value represent two forms of knowledge, not one; their identification
is impossible; considered as objects of knowledge, they are
entirely unlike. What is more, each of them is attained by
a unique logical procedure. In two respects, however, they
are alike : both are recognized by the same mind, and both
are verified in its experiences. In the end, we must ask how
these two ways of knowing can function harmoniously in the
same experience, and in the service of the same subject.
2
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN FORMAL AND
MORAL REASON

22. The history of epistemology presents a succession of
attempts to overcome that dualism of our thinking which is
represented by the contrast between otJ,r formal and our
moral modes of comprehension. Aristotle wrestled with their
opposition in his separation of the active from the passive
reason. St. Anselm acknowledged this dualism of thought in
his opposition of reason to faith. The difficulty reappars in
Kant's distinction between pure reason and practical reason.
2

H. B. Alexander, Poetry and the Individual, 1906, p. 169.
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Bergson's distinction between intellect and intuition represents a modern version of the problem and his work leaves
the dualism of knowledge clearer now than ever before.
If the distinction between formal and moral reasoning is
valid, it should be possible to demonstrate t~at they rest on
entirely different psychological processes, and make use of
entirely different logical assumptions. Such a differentiation
between formal and moral logic is provided for by an analysis
which we owe to H. B. Alexander. 3 He indicates two psychologically distinct modes of thought, and derives them from
two equally distinct modes of experience.
"There are two habits or modes of thought essential to
all reflection which are responsible for the main puzzle of
philosophy and the inherent contradictoriness of reason.
The antithesis to which they give rise has been variously
designated. With the Greeks it was the contradiction of
the one and the many, of being and becoming; with the
moderns it is the problem of identity in difference, or, in
natural science, of uniformity and variation. All these
antitheticals arise from the contemplation of the thing,
that which suffers change yet remains self-identical. In
the mind's history the puzzle has found various solutions.
In aesthetics reconciliation is effected by the notion of,
harmony; in psychology, by the conception of personality; in natural science, by the doctrine of evolution."
" The two habits are the instinct for identification, or
the psychological experience of recognition, and the instinct for ascribing causes, due to the experience of volition,- that is, the power of thinking and willing, which
in joint operation constitute human efficiency. It is the
instinct of causal thinking which induces the primitive
mind to animate all Nature with will and intention. In
is the instinct for forming definite and responsible estimates of things which leads to those composite impressions that we call ideas."
Let us call that mode of thought which arises out of the
experience of volition, the logic of morals. The other mode
3 H. B. Alexander, Nature and Human Nature, 9hicago, 1923, pp.
59-60.
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of thought, which proceeds by finding identities, we may ca11
formal logic. Can it be established that these have different
objects of knowledge, are different as to their processes, and
serve different functions?
23. As for the 'objects' of these two forms of thought,
their 'real' object is the same: both point to things. Yet,
they interest themselves in different aspects of things.
Things may be regarded solely as evistents, as facts which
exist now. On the other hand, things have values, and these
values are independent variables. Facts, we say, are true.
They represent reality itself; and when we ask whether a
fact is true, we readily acknowledge that it is our notion of
the fact which we question, and not fact as such. Values too
exist, but their existential status is quite unique. They do
not have a conserved and quantitative existence, but they
nevertheless exist because 'they make a difference,' as the
pragmatists would say. They are potent forces, and because
of their significance for us, their reality is far less alien than
the reality of matter which is still a stranger to physics and
chemistry. Values have a certain embodiment in things.
This permits us to distinguish between two aspects of
'things,' their real conformations as contrasted with the
potentialities they possess. It is our moral reason which interests itself in values, and our intellect which interests itself in facts. It is the moral reason which is born of that
wonder of which Plato speaks. Moral reason ever finds
problems to be solved, though it is formal reason which discovers the means for its solution.
24. The methods of these logics are as fully at variance as
their ends. Formal logic proceeds by demonstration, of
which the syllogism of logic and the proposition of geometry
are the models. Moral logic proceeds by a method more akin
to conviction or conversion. The essential difference between
these methods is, that demonstration proceeds step-wise,
while conversion proceeds to belief by a continuous process
resembling growth. For example, the syllogism breaks up

77

36

The Concept of Duration

into three distinct judgments, and each judgment breaks up
into a subject and a predicate. On the other hand, our
allegiance to values grows upon us so continuously that we
can divide it into stages only by an artificiality. The "ladder
of faith" devised by William James 4 show how we proceed
from indifference to a value to full loyalty to it. James distinguishes seven steps in his ' faith-ladder ':
" 1. There is nothing absurd in certain views of the
world being true, nothing self-contradictory;
2. It might have been true under certain conditions;
3. It may be true, even now;
4. It is fit to be true;
5. It ought to be true;
6. It must be true;
7. It shall be true, at any rate true for me."
If we examine these stages closely, we shall see that running through them there is a continuous augmentation of
belief. Nor can we even say that our belief in an ethical
truth-claim has a definite beginning and a definite end. Here,
the ' truth ' grows upon us by degrees; and, in fact, we are
seldom if ever able to say of a moral worth whether we have
realized its full meaning or not. In th~ moral sphere, we
' dream ' our way through life in a true sense. There is,
indeed, a certain characteristic of dreams which we may
characterize as a certain disorganization of values. This
'displacement' of values in the dream is perhaps responsible
for most of its bizarre character. One dreams, perhaps, of
being in the midst of a great fire, but without the fear
typical of waking life; and it is this feature of the dream
which causes us to call it 'strange.' Things which in waking
life arouse us to ardor may leave us indifferent in the dream;
and conversely, happenings which do not stir us in waking
life may pervade the dream with an atmosphere of great concern. Perhaps the bizarre events and deeds of the dream
are really the consequence of these bizarre evaluations; and it
4

William James, Some Problems of Philosophy, 1911, Appendix.

78

Christian 0. Weber

37

is this 'transvaluation of values' in the dream which make
the dream seem distorted to waking consciousness. Now,
this characteristic of dreams differs from waking life only
in degree. Even in our most conscious moments we are dreaming ideals. · That is, we tend to weave a web of ideality about
the things we encounter and the events which we endure, as
though our minds would fain discover in them some .worth
which their appearance would seem to deny. And, as in the
case of the dream, our idealizations often have a bizarre
character, but like the dreamer, we cannot see this ourselves
while we weave them. While dreaming, we do not call ourselves dreamers, except in those rare instances when we pass
quickly from a stage between sleeping and waking. Now,
there are also rare instances of waking life when we are
able to catch ourselves in the midst of those fugues which
haunt the moral sphere of existence. Such rare instances
are also cases in which we awaken to. a higher leval of existence, or to a heightened tension of life. Illustration will
make clear what we mean. There are moods which occasionally lift us out of the atmosphere of practical daily life,
and during them this daily life appears curiously warped.
It may impress us as a phantasy in which we see ourselves
pursuing baubles whose gloss has now lost all charm for us.
When we survey the pilgrimages .and crusades of old we are
half tempted to regard them as performanced by dreamwalkers, moved by an ideal that is only half-articulate. And
in our own day, especially during the late war and after, we
have been living in a mental state which seems to have as
many difficulties with dream as with reality. Our indifference to the brutality of war and the crimes which still reverberate from it, is a complete analogy to the dreamer who
mingles with ferocious beasts without thought of fear.
Various occurrences in different parts of the world may be
very swords of Damocles hanging over civilization. What
proves us to be dreamers is our indifference to the possibility
of moral gain or loss. Meanwhile, our attention is centered
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upon football and radio as though destiny waited _upon them.
These warped values correspond to the fallacies of formal
logic. They indicate a certain incompetence of thought and
confusion of thought materials. It is the business of all
thinking to conquer a certain chaos which confronts it:
formal reason must distinguish between real facts and illusions, moral reason must distinguish between genuine values
and pseudo-values.
It is indeed hard to say in real life who the dreamers are.
Copernicus was hailed as a dreamer, but the outcome of his
heliocentric theory clearly proves that it was his critic who
dreamed. Just so, democracy is a clear idea which has
emerged from many attempts to formulate it. On the other
hand, the self-appraised 'realty' of the Prussian state has
turned out to be a warped phantasy, wholly unsuited to life.
We but flatter ourselves when we speak of 'clear consciousness.' In dreams, too, we often invent phrases which seem
weighted with great truth and perfect clarity; but in waking
we discern thereni only obscure suggestions of meaning,
which leave us astonished at their emptiness. Our ideas of
value never become absolutely clear. This is to say that
values never get out of the realm of becoming, just as facts,
by definition, are confined to the world of being. Unlike
facts, the reality of moral values is not guaranteed. Their
existence depends on the unyielding allegiance of those who
cherish them.
25. There are three great ideals which we regard as the
most general or inclusive: beauty, truth, and goodness. The
type of reality we ascribe to these is quite unique. The
reality of physical objects is constituted by their resistance
to our invasion of the space they occupy. Their very unchanging character shows that time does not affect them. They
endure in time only in the sense that we provide this duration
for them in our memories. A library serves as an extension
of memory only because we remember where it is, and the
alphabet with which it is to be interpreted. Duration in time
80

Christian 0. Weber

39

is always made possible by something which is not entirely
inscribed in space. If memory consists of a neural impression
and nothing more, we should be utterly at a loss to recall a
single experience unless we " remember " where, in the brain,
the "memories" are stored. That is, to remember where
our many memories are located in the brain it would be necessary to have a register or 'card index' of some sort. But
a register too is a material thing, and it would be necessary
to have another register to inform us as to what is recorded
on each of its cards, and so on to infinity. In short, to be
inscribed· in space is no guarantee of persistence in time.
Thus, our ' wax tablet ' memory is able to do service only
because th.ere exists a physical memory which is able to
utilize it.
Now, the reality of ideals is not at all due to the property
of unchanging duration. We acknowledge the concrete existence of goodness and beauty because of their attraction,
just as we are led to acknowledge the existence of physical
objects because of their resistance to our strength. Ideals
are real, not because they are unchanging, but because they
are changing. Liberty, mercy, courage, nobility, beauty, and
goodness, retain always the same names, but in each of them
every person may gradually see more and more or less and
less. It is because values and ideals rest on our loyalty and
faith in them, that they are always to some extent haunted
by slumber and dreams. It is in the sphere of values that we
are perhaps most likely to be overcome by slumber. There
is a certain fugitive essence of ' make-believe ' about our first
devotions to ideals of all sorts. Experience of an art gallery
may give evidence of this. We may gaze at a painting reputed to be great with a curious mixture of impulses; but
until we actually discern its greatness, some of these impulses, representing themselves as more real, constantly obtrude themselves ; so that we are npt sure, so long as we are
novices in art, whether we are attracted by beauty or driven
by mere curiosity or by the impulse to imitate others. The
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devotion of the populace to some social or political ideal involves a similar dreamy uncertainty, at the beginning. This
is why great causes require great leaders; and the great
leader is marked by his confidence that the cause he serves
" is fit to be true." Causes are " clarified " by a sort of insight quite different from the clarity that characterizes the
syllogism. A cause is made true by our devotion to it.
26. Formal reasoning succeeds best when wish and will
elements are entirely excluded. On the other hand, without
wish and will we should never arrive at conviction in the
moral sphere. To be convinced of the truth of a value it is
first of all necessary to experience some want which the
attainment of this value is able to satisfy. We arrive at a
conclusion regarding the value in question just to the degree
in which this vague and uncertain need becomes clear and
certain. In the sphere of formal reasoning on the other hand,
the first necessity is to be somewhat puzzled. One cannot
solve a problem until the problem is seen, we say. Now,
intelligence consists precisely in the capacity to see a problem;
and intelligence alone has nothing to do with the desire to
solve it. Perhaps the source of the greatest uncertainty of
the 'mental-age scales' so much in vogue is that they rest
upon as assumed willngness of the subject to solve the problems presented in the tests. In formal logic we go from
state of being to solution by means of discrete steps, during
which each step brings something conceptually 'new.' The
whole process of formal education has this step-wise characteristic of the syllogism. We go to college to learn thos~
things which we do not already know. If we learn by the
method of repetition, this is for the sake of a verbal memory
which cannot be otherwise acquired. That "two plus two
equals four." is not made more true by repeating the statement in a loud voice; its truth is necessary and universal, as
the Hagelians say. Yet, curiously enough, there is such
magic in mere repetition when we come to the sphere of
values. Values are made more true for us when we hear
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them repeated by others. For example, the rituals of the
church are the strongholds of ecclasiasticism, and we often
attend services expressly to see them, though for the thousandth time. "In the logic of morals, example is much more
eloquent for persuasion than is precept. Not that moral conviction is carried by the fact that so many people accept a
certain vaule. Indeed, progress in the moral sphere is often
due to the fact that some one individual will conceive and
adhere to some new ideal; and we are convinced by the very
&incerity of his devotion. In formal logic, on the other hand,
we verify the validity of a class by enumerating the cases
which support it.
Satire too holds a unique place in the psychology of reasoning. In matters subject to formal demonstration, resort to
sarcasm frequently results from paucity of arguments.
Failing to convince the mind of an opponent, we content ourselves with belaboring him. But in the case of values, it is
quite different for here satire plays a legitimate role. Cleverness has only a limited power of arousing moral insight. In
fact, our intellectual ingenuity quite- regularly outruns our
appreciation of values. It was the danger of this that led
Sir Oliver Lodge to hope that sub-atomic force may not be
discovered by man, until he adds to his spiritual stature, else
his cleverness may be the source of his own destruction.
27. Finally, the first principles of these logics are quite
different. H. B. Alexander 5 indicates the basic principles
assumed by each as follows:
" The assumption of human progress is to the logic of
morals what the assumption of the uniformity of nature
is to the logic of science. Like the assumption of uniformity, it is unprovable, and as in the case of the
assumption of uniformity, there are many faults of experience that appear to go against it. Both assumptions
are, in fact, articles of faith; neither is obvious fact, and
neither rests upon compelling reason. Nevertheless,
each is the foundation for all the rationality that is pos-
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H. B. Alexander, Nature and Human Nature, 1923, p. 122.
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sible in a whole department of human thought - the
assumption of uniformity in the structural analysis of
the world, the assumption of progress in its teleological
analysis. Science and morals respectively .are the births
of these two great fiducial articles of thought."
We will develop these distinctions in a few paragraphs.
In our moral reflection, we assume reality to be plastic, so
that it can be altered to suit the ideals we cherish. We
assume, not only the plasticity of the objective world, but the
efficacy of our wills. We assume the reality of creative
power; just as in formal logic we assume the fixity of structure. In this world of formal logic, the only kind of knowledge which is permitted is the knowledge represented by
identities and differences discovered between things which in
themselves exist once and for all. This sort of thinking rests
on the principle of similarity. On the other hand, there is
the principle of causality which lays it down that the universe
is such that the unique is possible. 6 Upon this principle rests
the logic of morals.
The contention that there is a logic of morals, having its
own object of knowledge, its own processes, and its own
standard of verification, is a daring departure from widespread belief, which will have it that the Aristotelian principle of contradiction is the accredited touchstone of all reasoning. Is it possible to establish a class of truths which the
Aristotelian principle is unable to touch? It is necessary first
to determine what Aristotle's conception of it is, and what
is its scope.
The principle of contradiction can be stated either positively or negatively. Stated positively, it is commonly known
as the law of identity. The law of identity assumes that all
things remain self-identical. Stated negatively, this law
6 The problem of the meaning of causality has called forth a vast
literature, and we ignore it at present only for the purpose of setting
forth our view of causality. In due time, we shall consider the famous
historical views of Aristotle, Hume, Bergson, and others.
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reads, " It is impossible for the same thing both to be a, and
not to be a; or, a is not not-a." 7 It is necessary to ask, first
of all, whether these laws are supposed to hold true of
reality, which is the object of thought; or whether they are
m~rely conditions upon which our thinking must proceed if
it is to be successful. With the claim that these are necessary
laws of thought in formal logic, we have no quarrel; but we
maintain that there is a mode of thinking in which this law
is useless. In fact, moral reflect.ion requires a principle which
is exactly the opposite of this law; that is, it will assume that
radical change is not incom'J)(l,tible with identity. As for the
implications of these laws for the reality about which we
think, it is necessary to take several distinctions into account.
If we take these laws to mean, so far as they concern reality
that particular things also remain self-identical while duration is taking place, they are obviously false unless taken in
one of two special senses. If a bit of wax loses its form, the
change of form is absolute so far as the wax is concerned.
Not so, however, for a living subject who remembers its past
form, and therefore retains in imagination the power of re.
storing this past state ideally. It is this potency of memory
which eventually enables the subject to restore the past form
of an object in actuality. Again, the substance of the wax
is not subject to the same sort of fortuity as is its form. Its
total substantial quantity remains the same in spite of the
dissolution of its particular form. Even if the bit of wax is
' lost ' to human ownership, its substance is supposed to exist
somewhere in the universe. But in this case, its substance
ic conserved only if the entire universe is, since it may be
anywhere in the universe. Since the mass of our particular
object has escaped to parts of the universe which we cannot
designate, we can 'save' it only by 'saving' the entire universe; just as the proverbial needle lost in the hay is saved
only by saving all of the hay in which it is lost. That is,
7

James E. Creighton, An Introductory Logic, N. Y., 1914, p. 350.
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our object seems lost only to our knowledge, but not in reality.
But is there here any possibility of maintaining the distinction between that which is saved in reality and that which is
saved to knowledge? We think not; because the conservation of the total universe is a matter which formal measures
are unable to determine. The conservation of the material
totality of the universe, so far as quantitative determinations
are concerned, is subject to neither proof nor disproof. For,
if the universe should increase in its total amount, we should
never discover this by making quantitative comparisons,
since there is no outlying universe with which we can compare it. Even if there were such a standard, we would have
no way of proving whether or not it was constant in its
amount. The same objection applies to out scientific instruments of precision. If they contract and expand with the
total universe, so far as these measures as such are concerned,
they could not settle the question whether the universe is
eonserved or not. The new school of relativists in physics
have made systematic use of these facts. There is another
matter that deserves mention. If the increase or the decrease of the amount of the universe involved some specific
part of it instead of the uniform and general change which
we have heretofore supposed, we should still be in difficulty.
For, to detect such a local change, it is necessary to apply our
instrument of measure locally, but in this case the instrument
would suffer the change which - we intended to measure.
Again, if our imaginary increase or decrease affected only
certain kinds of substances, so that brass were subject to
fluctuations of volume while iron were not, there would seem
to be a possibility of applying an iron standard to measure
the quantitative changes of the brass. However, we are of
course unable to say whether it is the brass which changes
or the iron, so far as the findings as such are concerned. To
be sure, if we should visibly discern the changes in the piece
of brass, we have two other interpretations open to us. Firstthat we suffer an hallucination, or second, that such a change
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in mass is actually occurring. But in this latter case, be it
noted that our judgment rests upon a most unique instrument
of precision, the sense-organs, and everything appears to
indicate that it does its measuring in a way which is quite
distinct from that of the instrument of the laboratory. So
far as instrumental measures are concerned, we are in a
perpetual doubt as to the conservation of the totality of the
universe. But grant that our instruments maintain constant
units, we are still in perpetual doubt as to whether or not
the needle is 'conserved' even while we hold it in our hands.
For the increment of increase or decrease which it undergoes
may be infinitely smaller than the smallest measure which we
employ. Here again we are at a loss to press the distinction
between saved in reality and saved to knowledge.
So much for the Aristotelian law, when applied to the total
universe. It is subject to neither proof nor disproof, so far
as quantitative measures are concerned; and the same is true
for particular objects or for local changes. But there is still
another way in which we should become aware of such
changes. It is possible to gauge the permanency of a quantity, not with the balances, but with the constancy of its resistance to voluntary effort. There might be in this case
an awareness of change even though the balances should
change with everything else. By voluntary effort, we mean
a sort of effort which involves creative labor: which is by
definition not subject to quantitative multiplication. This
last point will, of course, be disputed. But if effort be subject to the same proportionate increase or decrease as that
which the objects lifted themselves endure, then we are face
to face with a ' difference ' which makes no difference; and
if the increment of increase or decrease in the mass of the
bodies were so minute as to escape detection, we are again
dealing with a difference which makes no difference. Is it
not possible that the sole business of the Aristotelian law, and
the logical system which rests upon it, to deal only with the
universe in its static aspect? That is, with such changes as
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do not affect us at all, or whose effects are so small as to be
of no concern to us? Before accepting this interpretation we
must consider others which are current.
28. The Aristotelian principle is sometimes interpreted to
mean that there is a persistence of identity in spite of change.
Verbally, at least, this would seem to be an express denial
of it, but since this version of it is given by good authorities, 8
it should be examined. What meanings may be attached to
the notion of the persistence of identity in the midst of
change? It may mean, that a thing may change in one respect but remain unchanged in others; as the frozen water
of a piece of ice ·may change its form in melting, yet be the
same quantum of substance. Now, in what sense is this true?
The properties of elements are the only signs by means of
which we are able to identify them. New combinations of
elements invariably give new properties, and we are in a
perpetual doubt to know whether they have changed in substance or not. Nor can chemistry help us here, for the prob-lem is not one of identity of kind, but of individuality of
quantum. We revive here the threadbare problem of substance and accident, though we need interest ourselves only
in one point concerning it, and that point fairly obvious,
namely, that if substance is something totally different from
'accidents,' or, in more modern terms, totally different from
properties, then we shall never know, from instrumental
measures alone, whether substances persist unchanged when
they are combined. Nevertheless, there is still a legitimate
sense in which we may speak of the substance of a thing.
After combining substances in various ways, we are able to
restore or recover each of them by chemical analysis. Perhaps the absolute substance of a thing is a notion which has
grown out of such experiences. We do not mean that substance refers specifically to our power of creating the similitudes of the past states of objects. We do mean, that this
experience of ours with things convinced us that there is
8
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something enduring about them, which is not destroyed by
combining them with other substances. There is something
within them which plays a constant role in enabling us to
restore past states s.o successfully. Thus the Aristotelian
law, assuming the persistence of specific, essences is made
possible by that which is not so 'given,' namely, the reality
of human power.
But the doctrine, identity in the- midst of change, can be
illustrated otherwise: we selected a case that is against it.
Consider a bit of wax which retains all of its properties except that of form, which is subject to certain alterations.
But in this case, the difficulty is that we really regard our
object as a situation; and we merely say that in this situation,
the form is an independent variable. That is, we secure the
identity in the midst of change by taking the object as at
once singular and plural. We get change by exclusive attention to the form, and then get identity by shifting the attention to the other properties of the wax. Our object is really
a constellation of objects, and we exercise the illegitimate
privilege of taking form as exclusively representing the object, only to give this up in favor of the other properties of
the wax. Thus, we demonstrate a simultaneous identity and
change at the expense of the untenable notion of a simultaneous unity and plurality.
But there is another way out of this difficulty. This consists in making use of the notion of successive time rather
than that of simultaneous time. From this point of view we
may apply the Aristotelian principle to complex objects without inconsistency. Our law will now read: objects remain
self~identical in tke respects in which they do not change.
Or, if our object is indeed simple, our law says that it cannot
at once be a and not-a. That is, if it is to change, this change
cannot be accomplished without the passage of time. The
Aristotelian principle, then, does not deny that change can
occur; it simply states that until a change does occur, the
thing remains self-identical. . Is this a principle which serves
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to prove itself? Rather, it is a device which verbally saves
itself from the need of verification. But it is a device which
may nevertheless serve to guide thought: and we think that
this is really the great service which the Aristotelian law
gives to formal reasoning.
29. So far, we have devoted ourselves to an analysis of
what the Aristotelian law must mean. We find, that standing
alone, it is the chief of those hypotheses whose great characteristic is that they serve to guide thought and research,
though they are not themselves subject either to proof or
disproof. These we call axioms. Axioms are by definition
self-evident, and it will be illuminating to ask what brand
of self-evidence they have. Their self-evidence does not rest
on demonstration. Geometers have sought in vain to demonstrate the famous axiom of Euclid, that through a given point
only one straight line can be drawn which is parallel to a
given straight line. Finally, Lobachevski and Riemann found
that they had better success in denying the various axioms,
and from axioms based on these denials succeeded in establishing new geometries. But our confidence in the self-evidence of axioms rests on another basis, which is the unexceptional success with which they govern the very processes
of thought and conduct. Are they only conventional, only
useful, only 'descriptive short-hand,' as Pearson describes
them? This is the confessed belief of a number of savants,
including besides Pearson, Mach, Poincare, Ostwald, and
Metchnikoff. But these views leave untouched the puzzle of
how knowledge could guide us aright in a world of reality if
this knowledge is not somehow true to that reality. We
should have a far more complete theory of knowledge if we
could show that the principles of science are not only useful
but true. Is it possible to supply this deficiency? Can we
hope to give to the principle of contradiction, as the classical
type of all " useful " conventions, a richness of meaning and
truth in addition to the 'usefulness' which everyone grants
to it already?
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To this end, we may avail ourselves of another observation
of Poincare; namely, that such laws as the law of conservation, or the principle of least action are based on experiences so omnipresent that they have escaped our notice. 9
They are not subject to verification because they are the result of innumerable observations, so numerous that they have
become unconscious. In other words, Poincare here says,
that just to the degree that demonstration becomes perfect,
it gradually ceases to be subject to verification. Like the
ether, the air, and the rotation of the earth, it defies perception by its very omnipresence. Water, said Bergson, is the
last thing that a deep-sea fish will ever discover. Now the
principle of contradiction may be regarded as a habit of
thought as ancient as life itself, and it escapes our discernment because it is a part of that discernment itself. Back
of habit there lies a necessity which drives it; and the more
ancient the necessity, the more insensible to it will be the
habit.
Is it possible that the principle of contradiction has a vast
richness of meaning buried under such deep strata that we
miss all but the bare fossil which remains in the text-books
of logic? We do indeed think so, and it is because this useful
habit of thought is but the tool of a greater mind which
wields it, that we employ psychological rather than logical
analysis to arrive at its meaning. We do not aim to give it
greater usefulness, but greater meaning.
To begin with, the principle of contradiction presupposes
the fact of memory on the part of the subject and employs it.
Memory is indispensable in securing the self-identity of an
object, for it is memory which preserves its antecedents for
it. So far as the 'poor' objects are concerned, their changes
are absolute, for they have no memory of their past locations,
positions, and conformations. Atoms are transformed entirely or not at all, and the pure space which they vacate
leaves no lingering impress of their occupancy. But science
9
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considers the changes of objects as relative. Science is right,
thanks to memory; for it is our remembrance of the past
position of an object that enables us to restore that past
position. It will be objected that this original position might
be restored by chance, and in this case the intervention of
memory is unnecessary. But it would be a chance without a
calculus, since the number of positions in the totality of
space is infinite. That is, the chance that mere physical
states have of restoring themselves is infinitely small. But
with the intervention of memory, we are able to speak of
the relativity of change. Moreover, we are also able to speak
of the essence or substance of objects. Formal logic does
not explain our intuition that there is something about a
thing which is not an accident or a property, and to explain
this 'something' we turn metaphysicians. And as metaphysicians, we call this ' something ' which persists through
change substance or essence. Those logicians, therefore, who
interpret the Aristotelian principle to mean the persistence
of identity in the midst of change are going beyond their
logic, or else they take logic and metaphysics to be the same
thing. Properties may change but the substance of a thing
persists, we say. But, outside of the light thrown on the
problem of substance by memory, we can only say that substance is to be described by the predicate being, but this also
describes everything else.
But the role of memory in epistemology supplies another
approach to the problem of ontology. It is memory that holds
the power of restoring objects to their original form; and
because of memory it is literally true to say that after ice
has melted into water that a certain substance within it plays
a positive role in restoring the properties of ice again. To
be sure, we secure this relativity of change at the price of
the absoluteness of time; for the time of memory itself is
absolute in the sense that it occurs but once; and we shall see
that the fact of time (in the sense of duration) cooperates
with memory in giving meaning to the Aristotelian law.
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30. The law of contradiction is often stated without any
formal reference to time, but there is none the less an implicit reference to it. In fact, we have seen that this principle amounts to a positive assertion with regard to time:
it definitely implies that change cannot occur without time.
The law does not say that a can never be not-a; but only
that it cannot become not-a without a passage of time. Now,
what sort of time does this change to not-a require? Not
mathematical time, because its moments do not prolong
themselves into sequent moments. Sequent moments form a
time in which memory cannot operate: and although a
should be subject to millions of changes, it should never suspect that it had changed at all. Nor could we know that it
changed if mathematical time were the only time of experience. Mathematical time, like the line which is its emblem,
is infinitely divisible, and at infinity, its instants will be
instantaneous, that is, occupying no time at all. Its instants,
like Zeno's ill-fated arrow, can never make progress. Thanks
to the real time of memory, however, this steeple-chase of
mstants is securely bridged. Time in the sense of duration
will· divide, but only at the cost of great effort. Our power
to divide a period of time into smaller parts is limited by
attention. Our smallest instances are no larger than a single
act of attention. The time of duration is also continuous,
and the proof is, that the work of memory cannot otherwise
be explained. To demonstrate this was the great work of
Bergson in his Matter and Memory. Here we may confine
ourselves to the most obvious proof of the continuity of
memory. Memory does not store its various ideas as apples
are stored in a basket. On the contrary, each idea that enters
the memory act sas a leaven: all of the knowledge already
there pecomes changed because of its presence, and it borrows
from each element some of its native meaning. We add ideas
to memory somewhat as we add grains of salt to a glass of
water; soon the water is permeated through and through.
We may exaporate the water and thus recover the salt in its
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original form; but an idea which has mingled with a certain
individual's memory can never again appear in its original
form: the time of a memory is not repeatable, it occurs but
once. Of course, it may be that the salt too bears somewhere
within it an ine:ffacable record of its past; if so, this could
only prove that the notion of mathematical time is a fiction,
for physical objects as well as for living objects.
31. A characteristic of memory which is just the opposite
of what we have just now indicated is that memory can be
unrolled in an auxiliary space, so that we can divide it into
the past, present, and future. Does this perhaps indicate
that memory-time is symbolized by the properties of a line?
We may take C. A. Strong's convictions on this matter as
the point of approach. 10 Strong attacks the problem as to
how the preservation of the past and the succession of the
past, present, and future can be reconciled. The past and
the future, he says, can only maintain their juxtaposition
when divided by an indivisible instant "x.". But at such
an instant, he rightly observes, time will cease to be real,
"for the flight of time will be arrested." Strong proposes
to meet the difficulty by the necessary conclusion that x, if
it is to be real time at all, must be " awx "; that is, it is
never so small "that all of its parts will be given at once."
Yet, it tends to be an "infinitesimal change." That is, the
transition from the past to the future is a succession " spun
out infinitely fine." 11 In this case, the present is sharpened
down to the point 0, and yet having a beginning and an end,
since it is "spun out infinitely fine." Strong tries to meet
this difficulty, of a present which is at once spanless, but
which is still "spun out," with the notion of infinity. But
this is of no avail, for the present will become spanless only
at infinity; and when this occurs, it ceases to be " spun out."
Finally, he meets this new difficulty by distinguishing between
1 0 C. A. Strong, "Consciousness and Time," Phychol. Re v., Vol. III,
1896, pp. 149-157.
11 Op. Cit., p. 152.
1
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the time in which consciousness exists and the time of which
it is aware. 12 "The time that we are directly consciousness
of it is not the real time that elapsed." The 'real' time; he
says, is that of the point-instant, engaged in its infinite successions from the past to the future. This is the time in
which consciousness is. The time of which we are actually
aware is given by the memory. The time in which the mind
is only appears to us representatively. 13 His representative
time corresponds to what we have called mathematical time.
Since he accepts this time as real, Strong is forced to deny
reality to the time of memory. He concludes, "Our apparently direct consciousness of the immediate past is an
illusion," and " to take this illusion seriously is to be guilty
of a sort of nalve realism in the field of time. Our consciousness of even the nearest past must be ideal, not actual;
representative, not intuitive." 14
We have said that the principle of contradiction definitely
implies that without the passage of time, change cannot take
place. Strong does not deny this, but leaves us with the
result that this passage of time is not real, but only conceptual. The reference to time by the principle of contradiction
would therefore be only a useful convention. That time
should be required for a to become not-a is due only to an
ideal, a representative necessity. To sum up, the Aristotelian
law requires the notion of time to give it meaning. That is,
when it declares that a cannot at once be not-a, it positively
declares that in order for a to become not-a the passage of
time is required. We have sought to determine whether the
notion of mathematical time is able to fulfill this need. We
find that it is utterly unable to do so. For, in order to make
the notion of a change from a to not-a possibl.e, a memory of
the state a is necessary after the change to not-a has taken
place. But this remembered persistence of the past, and the
Op. Cit., p. 150.
1a Op. Cit., p. 155.
14 Op. Cit., p. 156.
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continuous and irreversible time which it implies are themselves radical violations of the Aristotelian principle. Both
of them declare the persistence of identity in spite of radical
change.
This situation presents alternatives. We may perhaps adhere to the Aristotelian principle as the only intelligible principle in existence. But for this we must pay a price, and the
price will be that the Aristotelian principle itself becomes an
insoluble enigm.a; it will appear to be a principle which
' works ' with unerring success in our real experience; and
yet, it is theoretically suited to an artificial, ideal, and wholly
conceptual experience, namely, the experience measured by
mathematical time. The only world with which the Aristotelian law is in logical harmony, is the conceptual world
of the text-books and the classroom. Here it enjoys that
freedom from inconsistency which is the academic touchstone of truth. But in the sphere of action this principle
presents a baffling contradiction, for it successfully solves
the problems which arise in time in that it enables us to restore order and continuity to a world which alters its form
from day to day because of the transforming effects of time.
But, strange to say, it is this very transforming time that the
Aristotelian principle cannot touch.
There are two solutions for this difficulty. We may say,
as Strong chooses to do, that the notion of this transforming
time is itself an illusion. In this case, the real time for us,
that is, a concept of time which obeys the Aristotelian principle, will be a time " in " which we are, but it can never be
a time of which we are " aware." The time of which we are
"aware," that is, the continuom~ time of memory which
carries within it its own past, is an illusion. What have we
gained by accepting this alternative? We aimed to secure a
monism of knowledge. That is, we sought to erect the Aristotelian principle as the sole principle of i,ntelligibility, adequate to all problems. But for this monism of knowledge,
we are forced to accept our universe as one in which the
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principles that are successful, are yet never true; and in
which the experiences of which we think we are "aware"
(experiences of duration) turn out to be illusory. We are
dualists in spite of ourselves.
The other way out is to accept duration, the time of which
we are " aware " as ontologically real. But in this case, we
must acknowledge that it remains opaque to the Aristotelian
principle. Its reality is vindicated by the fact of the interpenetration and yet mutual independence of the past, present,
and future. Its reality is vindicated by the experience of
memory which involves the persistence of identity in spite of
change. The entire phenomenon of growth requires a principle which is exactly the opposite of the Aristotelian law.
Otherwise, we cannot bridge the gap between the oak tree
and the acorn, or the gap in our pursuit of a host of minor
purposes which together attain an end that is entirely different from any of them. Thus, if we are to make the whole
of our experience intelligible, we are obliged to accept another
principle of intelligibility which is quite the opposite of the
principle of contradiction. Following the usage dictated in
the passage cited above, let us call this other principle, which
opposes itself to the principle of Aristotle, the principle of
progress.
Not the least of the grounds upon which we defend this
principle is the fact that it is required in order to explain
how the principle of contradiction can succeed. The Aristotelian law purports to be a law of change; but .there is no
point whatever in speaking of change if these changes perish
the instant after they occur. Change is a notion which gets
intelligibility only because of the fact of memory which is
somehow able at once to conserve the past and still represent
it as having perished. Only memory and duration enable
us to speak of the relativity of all changes of physical state,
for it is the memory which enables us to restore past states.
This alone saves change from being absolute. It is the relativity of change which enables science to adhere to its assump97
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tion that the universe is entirely conserved. The conservation of the universe means that time leaves no ineradicable
impress on it; so that a given state of the universe or of its
separate objects can occur more than once. The universe is
conserved to the extent that its past states can be repeated:
only in this sense can we say that it has lost nothing. But
to repeat these past states presumes the reality of memory
and the reality of human power. Thus, the principle of contradiction does not require for its verification a demonstration
in formal logic, for formal logic is itself based upon this
principle; axioms and first principles do not explain themselves. The principle of Aristotle rests upon nothing else
than the power which we as agents exert in the world of
objects; it rests on the "experience of volition."
32. We may therefore claim a certain logical priority for
the principle of progress, since the Aristotelian principle
presupposes it. We have rested this principle of progress
on the experience of volition, and it will be instructive to
enquire at more length what is implied by these terms. The
Aristotelian principle rests on a certain principle of understanding, the principle of identity. Upon this foundation all
of the processes of formal logic are based. The syllogism of
formal logic is but a method of revealing to the mind of another person identities already found. When the syllogism is
once formed, thought has already taken flight. When the
inventor of a syllogism presents it to another mind, that mind
simply follows the movement of thought which the syllogism
outlines, during which he too may attain or rather experience
that sense of clarity which is the sign that a new identity
has been attained. It is typical of the intellect that it reasons from the known to the unknown by the simple device
of finding identity after identity. It seems to be confined to
description. On the other hand, we have another faculty of
understanding which seeks to explain: it finds, not identities
but causes. This manner of thought rests, not upon the principle of identity, but upon the principle of causality, that is,
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it is "' due to the experience of volition." Is it possible to
establish the experience of volition as a unique source of
knowledge?
Hume derives and defends his scepticism on the theory
that all knowledge is confined to sensations and ideas. His
scepticism is the result of his refusal to recognize volition as
a source of knowledge. Now, Descartes, Leibnitz, Berkeley,
and Locke had undertaken to establish the existence of God
on the causal argument, thus making of volition a valid
source of knowledge. Hume refutes them with his wellknown contention that we can only know succession, not
necessity; sequences, not consequences. There are relations
between ideas but these relations are not causal relations.
The notion of causality, he held, owes its origin to a feeling
due to the constant conjunction of impression, that is, to
custom. For example, we decide that fire is the cause of
smoke, not because fire has some special inner potentiality,
but simply because we always observe that fire precedes
smoke. We are here at the crux of the problem of causality.
Is there nothing more in the problem of volition than the
observation of the succession of events? The issue Hume
raises is really the question "Are men machines or are they
not?" If Hume is right, then the terms causality and succession represent a distinction without a difference. That
there is a difference the whole evolution of social, political,
and religious life seems to indicate. Now, a mechanism has
two outstanding characteristics: in its activity, the uniformity of succession of which Hume speaks is nearly perfect. The other great trait of the machine is its incapacity
to profit from experience, that is, its incapacity to learn. On
the other hand, in a living organism, these traits are reversed:
the activities of the organism seem the farthest remove from
uniformity, while its capacity to learn is very great. However, we think that it is impossible to show that the machine
has monopolized uniformity of action, while the organism has
monopolized the capacity to learn. No matter how unfore99
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seen the activity of the organism m.ay seem from an external
study of it, it is still possible that the fortuity of its conduct
is only seeming, and is due to our inability to discover the
laws controlling it. The great success that biology and
organic chemistry have had in discovering the " chemical
mechanisms of conduct " lends support to this view. On the
other hand, there is a sense in which we may speak of the
' learning capacity: ' of material substance. The new machine
performs its task better after some ' practice.' The violin
fo the artist ' learns ' to respond to harmonious combinations
of tones. There are many sympathizers with Hering's notion
that memory is a general property of all matter. T. Brailsford Robertson 15 claims, on the basis of chemical demonstrations, that memory is of the nature of an autocatalysis.
Linseed oil, which has a fatty acid similar to one which can
be demonstrated in the nervous tissue, seems to display this
sort of 'memory.' It 'learns' to oxidize first more slowly,
then more rapidly. If kept inactive it seems to forget how
to oxidize, and its reactions become very slow. He even finds
that the quantity of these changes follows Weber's law, and
we thus get a hint that perhaps 'perception too is a similar
process. Rignando 16 has pr_oposed an explanation of the
learning process as due to electrical processes of the nervous
system. The cells are · electrical accumulators, and the
specific sensory processes leave in these cells a specific sub:stance which is added to those which are already there.
Under the right conditions, these substances will again give
rise to their characteristic currents, which accounts for the
r~call of memory.
Valuable as these researches may be for science, we must
nevertheless insist that they neither prove nor disprove the
existence of some vital entity which may be present in addi15 T. Brailsford Robertson, "Sur la Dynamique Chimique du Systeme
Nerveux Centrale," Archiv. de Physiol., Vol. VI, 1908, p. 388.
16 E. Rignando, Upon the Inheritance of Acquired Characters, Tr. by
B. C. H. Harvey, 1911.
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tion to the chemical processes described. We believe that
mechanism and vitalism are but points of view so long as we
bring to bear upon them, only the data of chemistry and
physics. These are necessarily limited to the discovery of
material states. But material states, like the atoms which
compose them, may be infinitely refined. That is, no matter
how minutely we trace the inter-locking of physical forces in
the organism, we are still beset with the doubt, that if our
analysis had only been more minute, we would have discovered breaks of continuity and sources of indetermination
in the protoplasm. But it will be objected that the scientific
method is bound to find law-abiding• reality, however minute
its researches. This amounts to saying that the scientific
method is incapable of recognizing any sort of reality except
that which is true to the principle of mechanical determinism.
In this case, then, it is wholly inadequate to the problem,
mechanism versus vitalism. Physical principles are of necessity limited to the discovery of physical states. Hence, the
absurdity of Laplace's rejection of God: because he searched
the heavens with his telescope without being able to fiid Him.
In the last analysis, we are only able to speak of the ' living'
because of our inward experience of it. As Hoernle observed,
a living body falls just as rapidly as a dead one: gravity finds
no difference between them.
33. However, though experimentation cannot tell us the
difference between an organism and a chemical machine;
introspection is fully able to do so. For, there is one aspect
of inner experience which is our daily lot, and which possesses
such realism that it leaves the hypothesis of mechanics futile
when applied to the living. I refer to the experience of
effort: of this the machine is incapable by its very definition.
\Ve mean, that mechanical explanation owes its distinctiveness
to nothing else than the elimination of the notion of effort.
A volitional act possesses a unique character to which mechanical schematism is wholly inadequate. It is impossible
t oimagine that the units of an interacting system exert
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effort; o nthe contrary, each is completely yielded to its own
'inertias. To be in space is to be of necessity subject to all
of the enfarced movements of space. Every body follows the
path of 'least resistance'; but even here we dramatize, for
the ' least resistance ' is still some resistance. There is here
an intrusion of our ineradicable belief that where there is
motion there is life.
Persisting in the mechanical mode of thought, let us examine changes of physical states. In doing so all we shall
find will be other intermediate states, and so on to infinity.
Thus, if we say that the cause of an event is a preceding state
we are logically compelled to retraverse all such states to the
very beginning of things. Because of this necessity J. S.
Mill concluded that the universe is the cause of all things. Of
course, this leaves us none the wiser concerning particular
problems of causation that trouble us. Practically, we are
forced to terminate this regress of states somewhere. We
never look for all of the antecedent conditions of an event;
but instead select a few that must serve by proxy for the
whole universe. In the classic example of the cow that set a
city on fire by kicking over a lantern:, we single out the cow
and the lantern as the causes, and wholly ignore the city and
the rest of the universe. Yet, logically, no fire could have
occurred without these. Is this selection of causes then entirely arbitrary? This is not at all the case, for in selecting
the proximity of cows and lanterns as the cause of fires we
are led to prevent such misfortunes in the future. We are
unwilling to prevent fires by preventing the building of cities
because the cities are worth the risk. What rule do we employ in selecting the 'right' cause out of that immensity of
causes which Bosanquet calls the ' ground ' of the universe?
Clearly, we designate that antecedent as cause which our
human power can control. It is a volitional cause which
terminates our search for the causal nexus of an event; and
volitional acts are ever engaged in changing physical states,
whether of the nervous system or of the world at large. It
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is only mind that can cause and it is only mind that can be
affected in any intelligible sense, so long as we insist that
matter has only mechanical ·properties. For, so long as
matter is true to mechanical principles it is only the path for
the transmission of effects. This view obliges us to define a
body as an eggregation of points where a multitude of forces
intersect: the body itself neither terminates nor initiates
anything.
To be a cause in the psychological sense is far more than
being an antecedent state. To cause is to labor, and to labor
is to overcome resistance. Labor is the price of all creative
effects. The God of the theologians is said to create worlds
at the behest of thought. The perfection of this miracle is
spoiled by the circumstance that thought too costs an effort.
Moreover, like physical acts, an act of thought is paid without
the assurance of victory. We have here the realism of life
and the realism of chance.
34. And with the reality of effort and risk, goes the reality
of duration. True causation is not constituted by an alignment of physical states, but involves a creative development
in time. Hence, the volitional, and consequently moral scepticism of Hume and all others who seek to comprehend the
nature of life and responsibility without admitting the reality
of time in the sense of a duration. The timelessness of scientific principles means no more than a certain deliverance
from the fortuity of time to be obtained through their employment. This is in part key to the fact that science is the most
formidable instrument in the hands of men. Our freedom
becomes greater the more we are able to represent nature
mechanically; but this is only because we "run the machine"
as it were. Electricity becomes a human agency just to the
extent that we are able to discover the ' invariable' principles that govern its activity. We are able to prevent infectious diseases just to the extent that we discover the fatalistic
processes which underlie it. This ' invariable,' 'fatalistic,'
and ' static ' property of scientific laws constitutes their
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' timelessness.' and their ' timelessness ' is the symbol of their
power to deliver us from the risks which the future conceals.
That is, principles of science :foretell the future so accurately,
that we are able to say that time does not exist for them.
Their mathematical exactness is the badge of their usefulness. But the several natural sciences tend always to create
ulterior difficulties for themselves by their very insistence
that the formulae with which they garb nature are garments
of nature's own choosing. The geometry of the classroom
has all of the exactness which is required to make the intellect ' feel at home.' But the intellect, not satisfied with the
classroom, seeks to enforce its circles and triangles upon
nature at large. But nature chooses otherwise, and she refuses to supply us with a single triangle whose angles are
actually in accordance with the intellect's specifications.
Geometry requires that objects be perfectly rigid, otherwise,
they cannot take on perfectly geometrical forms. But such
bodies exist only as ideal possibilities, just as a perfect tri2.ngle has only an ideal existence.
35. The experiences of choice, chance, and of effort, lead us
unerringly, we believe, to a logic which is quite different from
the logic of formulae: a logic which moves in a world of its
own. The logic of causality testifies to a world of becoming
just as faithfully as formal logic testifies to a world of being.
We have suggested in some incidental paragraphs the manner
in which these two ways of thought mutually imply and support each other. Here again we see them cooperating in
presenting reality in a light that must often impress those
who have acquaintance with the strife and· instability of existence: Soldiers on the battle front, toilers in the earth and
on the trecherous sea. We mean the thought that the existence of the universe is just as possible as its non-existence.
The intellect declares, "Being is forever guaranteed." But
the logic of causality converts this into the resolve that being
shall endure. Being hangs on the feeble thread of our loyalty
and faith, and the intellect, too, depends upon this thread
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when it declares the universe to be eternally conserved. You
have ascribed to the intellect the function of guiding motive
in its work of transforming reality. Formal lQgic and mathematics are instrumental: they are ' unmoved-movers.' The
relation between formal and moral logic is therefore a moving
or dynamic relation. They seem destined to perpetual opposition to each other; and William James discerned the reason
for this when he declared that the never-stopping clock which
keeps metaphysics going is the conviction that the existence
of the world is just as possible as its non-existence.
3
EXPERIENCE AS THE UNIFIER OF FORMAL AND
MORAL REASONING

36. Our heuristic use of the concept of teleology has been
rather one-sided in this discussion; for we have almost constantly employed it to throw into relief the differences between the formal and the caus,al mode of thought. This
analysis has gone hand in hand with the distinction between
value and fact. But in actual life, value and fact inhere in
the same 'things,' and formal and causal reasoning are indulged by the same ' self.' Without values, the formal
opera,tions of the intellect would be stranded for want of a
problem. Without intellect, all paths leading to the realization of values would be blind ones. Impulse is not free without reason to guide it; and the reasonableness of conduct as
well as its freedom is made possible, as Milton and Dante
discovered, by the rational choice of alternatives.
We must then return to the world of particular objects
and deeds, with their particular loci in time and space, to see
how impulse and reason work out their mutual destiny. We
shall see that here they play into each other's hands, as it
were. Impulse, never pure, will harbor unawares the results
of past reasoning. Reason, never quite succeeding in "loving
truth for its own sake,'' will linger about those problems
which value lends the spice of interest. Their dualism of
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function again leads to that continuity of process which is
8moothly and imperceptibly that the unreflective life o fcommon-sense knows nothing of the contradiction between the intellect which posits reality as static, and our moral sense
which nevertheless always thinks in terms of transformation.
It is indeed, as James said, as though we lived in two worlds,
and that these worlds are equally possible. Our formal logical
powers have developed to orient us to the world of being;
and our moral sense adapts us to the world of becoming.
But we have still to see how two modes of thinking, so diverse
as these, are able to cooperate with each other. In our discussion we have so far contrasted them, perhaps too sharply,
in the interests of analysis. We are now willing to say that
this analysis, like most of the work of science and philosophy,
substitutes artifice for reality. The formal and moral modes
of thought are perhaps never exercised in pure isolation.
They are but two opposing tensions of the same movement
of thought. The form of thought which we normally exercise, whether philosophizing or not, is imagination; and
imagination is that potent muse who weaves garments of
intelligibility with which we clothe the many dark things of
the world about us. Fact and value are but the warp and
woof of these garments, and formal and moral reasoning are
but the two hands with which the imagination weaves. The
manner of this weaving is the theme which will next occupy
our attention.

IV
TIME AS THE UNIFIER OF THE FORMAL AND MORAL
ELEMENTS OF REASON

1
IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE AND REFLECTION

37. There is a certain magic lamp, like that of Aladdin, by
means of which we may cause certain chronic difficulties of
thought to vanish. This lamp is the body, by means of whose
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action the chasm which reflection finds between concepts and
things is securely bridged. Immediate experience knows
nothing of the stubborn problems that confront us when we
philosophize about experiences. But immediate experience
causes the problems of reflection to vanish without giving
them a dialectical solution, which is what the philosophers
require. Immediate experience is mute: is its silence that of
wisdom or of ignorance?
Our previous discussions have been in the main critical
accounts of some of the ways in which immediate experience
has been interpreted as knowledge. The philosophies of the
schools desire to render immediate experience articulate, and
especially to prove that their voice is its very own. Hegel
would interpret all experience in terms of formal ideas.
Schopenhauer saw in experience only the manifestation of
blind will. Behaviorism contends that the richness of immediate experience may be reduced to articulations of reflex
arcs. Of common sense we had little to say, for common
sense does not explicitly require immediate experience to
have any intelligibility other than that which is constituted
by our successful actions. Yet, common sense implicitly uses
immediate experience as knowledge and it does so particularly with regard to the difficulty we have all the while
emphasized: that of the opposition between fact and value,
between being and becoming. We believe that there is an
important thought neglected datum of experience which
serves as the meeting ground for these apparently inimical
concepts: that datum is the reality of effort." It mediates between our antitheticals as the principle of growth in the acorn
mediates between the soil and the living oak tree. We do
not propose, as did Condillac,1 to assume a statue, endow it
with the sense of smell, and thereby secure ' from mere
stone ' a complete soul. If but the statue have smell, the
rest is comparatively easy. Condillac's assumption is typical
of many bootless attempts to derive the living from the inert,
1

Condillac, Traite des Sensations, Pt. 1, Chap. 11, Par. 6.
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by surreptiously endowing the latter with a mite of sensibility and then invoking ' evolution ' to complete its endowment. The feeblest sentience of which we can conceive is
already at an impassable distance from matter. Matter and
life differ, not in degree, but in kind. Life, materialism tries
to say, is " matter which has passed over and recognized
itself." Here is the absurdity of every attempted monism:
we set out to resolve mind to matter, but end by endowing
matter with the very psychic properties we desire to banish.
We should accept matter and experience as equally real and
should attempt to compel immediate experience to yield us
the mystery of their union. There is one experience in particular which should carry us far into the analysis of immediate experience, perhaps to the very heart of it. That is
imagination, which is at once a way of experiencing and a
way of knowing.
38. Imagination, we believe, is a generic type of experience
in which we· are led at one extreme to literal contact with
things, and at the other to literal contact with ideas. Imagination is to us a sort of thinking which must have been
present at the first breath of life. It is the first articulation
of experience. Indeed, our imagination is free from the keen
sense of estrangement from reality which is typical of conceptual thinking. There are numerous occasions when we
are in a quandary as to whether our experience is real or
fancied. Perhaps, if we look closely at the matter, we shall
see that we move continually in a medium in which ideas
hold commerce with things. Imagination is action grown
somewhat abstract and symbolic, but is still so near to experience that it bears much of the character of deed. Out
of primal imagination formal and moral reasoning have developed. The most essential property of imagination is
creative inventiveness. Now, this creative inventiveness of
imagination touches its own forms as well as everything else.
For, imagination has its own principle of thought, as basic as
are the principles of contradiction and of progress to reason
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and will. This principle of the imaginative faculty is the
principle of conceivability.
What is the relation between the principle of conceivability
and the principle of contradiction and the principle of progress? What is the relation of imagination to the formal and
moral modes of thought? Finally, what inference does the
nature of imagination lead us to draw regarding the ontological character of the world in which imagination moves?
These are the major problems which occupy us in the present
chapter.
2
CREATIVE IMAGINATION

39. The subject of imagination is somewhat neglected in
current psychology. 2 Its discussion often appears as though
incidentally under headings devoted to "thought," " representation," "feeling," and "memory." Current separations
of the imagination from reason are far from satisfactory;
in most discussions of the subject we are either burdened
with unworkable definitions, or else we fail to carry them
through consistently. For instance, imagination is frequently
spoken of as dealing with 'imaginary' objects, in contrast
with reason as dealing with 'real' ones. We have indeed
some occasion for holding that mathematics is even more
successful with its imaginary entities. But it is not alone
2 Coleman R. Griffith (General Introduction to Psychology, N. Y.,
1923) gives a single index reference to it which falls in a chapter on
" Body-Mind " capacities in general. McDougall ( Outline of Psychology, N. Y., 1923) treats imagination in a chapter ·on "anticipating"
and "recollecting." W. B. Pillsbury (Fundamentals of Psychology,
N. Y., 1916) discusses it with memory. This is also the case with E. B.
Titchener (A Text-Book of Psychology, N. Y., 1913), and with H. C.
Warren (Elements of Human Psychology, N. Y., 1922). Imagination
is given a separate chapter by the following authors: R. S. Woodworth, (Psychology, N. Y., 1921); M. W. Calkins, (A First Book in
Psychology, N. Y., 1919); by J. R. Angell, (Psychology, N. Y., 1908),
and by James in his Principles, Vol. II.
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careless usage that is to blame for the failure to keep imagination distinct from reasoning. The fact is that the
nature of reasoning is such that reality and unreality must
enter into all forms of it. There is no sharp line of separation between fact and inference. Accordingly, it is not permissible to assume that one sort of reasoning deals with the
' real ' things and another sort with ' imaginary ' things.
Again, it is frequently said 3 that the aim of imagination
is to discover some new object, such as is involved in mechanical invention, while it is the purpose to discover relations between things which exist already. But was there ever
a new object invented without a basis of real relations obtaining between things? And was there ever a relation discovered which is not in some sense a ' new' relation? Or
indeed a relation observed without at least some notion that
the objects related play a part in the process? Actually, we
cannot employ the external objects of thought as the basis
for discriminating modes of thinking, because in every case
the 'thing' thought is complex: It holds within itself something of interest for every possible note of comprehension.
A ' thing ' is at once a unity and a multiplicity, a fact and a
value, a form and a potentiality, a matter and an idea. Nor
can we distinguish modes of° thought on the supposition that
one discovers relations and the other the obj,ects related; for
relations and the things related mutually imply each other.
There is yet another way in which we may distinguish th~
work of imagination from the work of formal thought. We
may say that the analogies and the resemblances with which
the imagination deals are 'remote' while those involved in
reasoning are 'exact.' But if we say only that the work of
imagination is characterized by the looseness of its analogies
we are simply saying that imagination is characterized by its
proclivity for error. We must supplement this by saying
that imagination is characterized also by potency in discover3 E. B. Titchener, "Thought," New Inte,rnational Encyclopedia,, 2nd
ed., XXII, (1914), p. 249.
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ing exact and minute resemblances. That is, imagination is
a sort of thought where the maximum of exactness and inexactness mingle. In short, it is the lively realm of discovery,
where bare conceivability is brought into touch with the
world of the concrete. But this is to regard imagination and
reason different only in degree. In this view, imagination
is characterized by its fecundity, and reason is noted for
rigid censorship over the work of imagination, rejecting such
of its products as are not suited to reality. But there is yet
another difference between reason (including both the formal
and moral aspects of it) and imagination, one which is more
than a difference of degree: we refer to the circumstance
that the forms of reason deal either with facts or values
taken alone, while imagination addresses itself to both at
once. This is but to reiterate our former statement, that
imagination is a form of thought which is as rich and complex as experience itself. Experience and imagination are
each acquainted with the antithesis of fact to value. Now,
fact and value are both modes of thought and ontological
traits of the world in which thought moves. Their opposition in thought points to a similar opposition at the very
heart of things. And if thinking aims at the comprehension
of reality then the duality of fact and value, 0£ what is and
what ought to be, will never be lost to sight in any successful
thinking whatsoever. It is this full reasoning, primary in
both the logical and chronological sense, which we choose to
call imagination. Imagination is the generic mode of thought
which mediates between the world of being and the world of
becoming. But, with the passing of time, imagination
specializes its work, and gradually develops special ways of
comprehending the antithesis between fact and value. Hence,
formal and moral logic, special modes of dealing with facts
and values respectively. These special forms of thinking
have developed from imagination by a process of growth;
but we believe that each bears within itself the reminiscence
of the other, and that when they unite, we have primal im111
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agination, capable of dealing with a world sundered between
that which is and that which ought to be. Formal and moral
reasoning are only opposite tensions of the same movement
of thought, and we shall see the proof of their genealogy in
the fact (which we hope to establish) that when we deal
with facts, values are implicit, and vice versa.
40. To demonstrate that imagination resolves the antithesis
between fact and value is a meaningless undertaking, unless
we first describe the nature of this antithesis. 4 We have
already described fact and value as different objects of
thought and also as objects of different kinds of thinking.
Nevertheless, the contrast between fact and value is a matter
far easier to experience than to describe; and although we
may assign contrasting properties to them, analysis shows
that this procedure is somewhat artificial. In the end, we
are forced to rest our distinction of fact and value on intuition rather than on conceptualization, and our statement of
the antithesis must accordingly be in the nature of a description of the two types of intuition involved. Intuition is not
taken here in any cryptic or occult sense. By intuitive
knowledge we mean that kowledge which is constituted by the
direct experiencing of something; and it is a form of comprehension upon which· even the most a priori of concepts
must depend for their claim to intelligibility.
There is one point of contrast obtaining between fact and
value which seems, to be sure, at once conceptual and intuitive: this is their very duality itself. But of course this
rlualism as such has no content outside of the intuition of it.
That is, to achieve a conceptlal. contrast between fact and'
value it is necessary to give a content to their dualism. But
this procedure will never escape artificiality because fact and
xalue are unstable as existents. For instance, we may
enumerate the individual properties of gold and brass with
i:tome certainty, because they are free from the effects of
4 The concepts, fact and value are analyzed in Chapter III, division
38, but their full opposition is best indicated by Chapter III as a whole.
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time, at least, so far as all observational intents are concerned. But fact and value represent, not only the properties
within an object, but points of view in the subject who contemplates and handles the object. Consequently, the same
'thing' is subject to both formal and moral judgments.
Logicians have long since observed the dual significance of
the copula. To say that " snow is white " constitutes two
judgments in one: the statement posits, not only that snow
" is," but also that it " is white." We distinguish between
the material substance of a thing and its qualities. The existential status of material substance, that is, of quantity,
rests on the intuitive experience of its resistance to our wills.
Snow exists for us when we discern that it blocks our progress
or will block our progress if we invade it; just as a phantom
is ' unreal ' because it does not resist us. But what of the
existence of values? We are convinced of their existence because they attract us. Now, it is by the qualities of things
that we are able to identify them as values. For instance,
the qualitative properties of snow enable us to distinguish its
potential values from that of other things which may nevertheless be quantitatively equal to it. Any given quantity is
a value, but this is only when we gauge it by means of
muscular effort in place of the balances. That is, a given
quantity becomes a value by making a qualitative appeal (in
this case, kinaesthetic) to us. Qualities are the symbols of
value; and this holds for all the senses. Only those things
which possess a significance for us are able to arouse qualitative experience.
It is because the apprehension of facts and values depend
on experience of resistance and attraction that we are obliged
to say that their distinctiveness can be verified only by an
intuition. Only immediate experience can tell us what resistance and attraction mean, and we could never reveal their
distinctiveness to a person incapable of experiencing them.
We may recognize in Plato's departure from the teaching of
the Pythagoreans as an early recognition of the distinction
113
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we here make between resistance and attraction. 5 The
Pythagoreans had taught that things exist by "imitation"
of numbers. These thinkers were interested in the quantitative status of existent things. It is the mutual externality
of things which leaves us only one resource when we wish
to take quantitative account of them, and this is to say that
they "imitate" each other. Indeed, the device of counting
is a process based on this generic idea of the " imitation "
of similars. On the other hand, Plato, very much alive to
the reality of values and ideals, conceived that things exist
by " " participation " in a form, and forms to Plato are ideal
existences in the sense of ' ends.' The Pythagorean and the
Platonic account represent two basic ways in which we apprehend the duality of our world: the world which resists us as
against the world which attracts.
But the world of experience is a world of particulars, and
unfortunately for the ideal of 'system' in philosophy, we
are unable to classify some things as ' facts,' only resisting
us in the sense that the proverbial table of Thomas Reid resisted him; and other things serving as ' values' in which we
may participate in the Platonic sense. Thinghood, Aristotle
reminds us, is always a compound of matter and form. This
is to say that things are at once facts and values. They are
facts in the multiform ways in which they are invariably
presented to us. They are values to the extent that they
promise to satisfy demand. But it is necessary to specify
just what is implied by demand. A demand is always the
requirement of something which lacks the existential characteristic of facts. To be sure, three sides are ' necessary ' to
a triangle, and six sides are necessary for a cube. But this
sort of necessity is purely logical: it is not at all of the
nature of a ' want ' such as we experience in moral matters.
It is because of this that the axioms of formal logic appear
as distinguished definitions. That is the formal sense that
5 Aristotle, Metaphysics, tr. by J. A. Smith and W. D. Ross, The
Works of Aristotle, Vol. VIII, Oxford, 1908, 987 b.
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this defines the triangle. But the necessity which leads us
actually to draw triangles is quite different: here for once
is a kind of necessity which is more than a convention. It
is the facination or the need of geometry, an ideal goal,
which leads us to the self-imposed 'necessity' of studying
Euclid. In short, things have value to the extent that they
offer to fulfill certain wants. Things indeed form the battleground where is waged the issue between being and becoming; and the line of combat is determined by our standards
of significance. 6 We choose the significances which are to be
real for us, and in time, this choice delitnits our very world
of perception for us. Our perceptual world, which constitutes
the ' world of fact ' par excellence, rests on our interests:
The world which we reject we will some day be unable even
to see.
It is this circumstance which justifies the inference which
we have several times drawn regarding the ontological status
of our world: being and non-being are equally possible. And
this is why we are eventually led to acknowledge that the
reality of facts and values rest on the " experience of volition " as truly as they do on the principle of resemblance.
Tmagination is able to 'resolve' the antithesis between the
logic of fact and the logic of value. But we must understand
the term ' resolve ' in an unwonted sense. We do not mean
that imagination resolves moral concepts to the concepts of
formal logic. To achieve this sort of simplicity has been the
futile hope of many philosophers. They forget that the dualism of thought points to a dualism in reality: the reality of
becoming cannot be banished by denying it on the conceptual
level. But there is another kind of simplicity which imagination provides. It enables us to pass successfully from concepts of value to concepts of fact; although this cannot b~
achieved without the expenditure of effort, the loss of time,
and the risk of failure. Effort, time, and chance are the in6

H.B. Alexander, Nature and Human Nature, Chicago, 1923, p. 72.
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exorable conditions which surround both thought and action;
and this is only to repeat that our world is not given once for
all, but is compounded of being and becoming. In imagination
as in experience, the real and the fictive enter into the same
drama; and it is this union which enables imagination to
solve life's problems. To the intellect, in its unimaginative
forms, this is incomprehensible. For the long and explicit
acquaintance with material reality ·1eads this uncolored intellect to say that the real and the fictive cannot "hang together." "Real coats cannot hang upon the ideas of pegs,"
it will say; it cannot see as does the moral reason (because
of its acquaintance with purpose) that we learn to hang real
coats upon real pegs only because we hang them there in
thought first. Again, the intellect has been too vaunting in
its self-assurance of familiarity with the real: it was
through reasoning from formal principles alone, ignoring
volition as a source of knowledge, that Berkeley and Hume
arrived at a scepticism concerning the existence of the reputedly 'real' material world.
Thanks to the striving
motives of our moral nature, the precepts with which the intellect is content are supplemented by action, and then
scepticism is dispelled by the admission of new data, the data
of volition. We must regard imagination as the archetype
of all reasoning. Formal and moral reasoning are but its
special forms. This is our thesis. Possibly as definition it
does not possess the structural simplicity which the current
logics r'equire. But our point is that the imagination must
satisfy the requirements of life in general, and not merely
the requirements of text or classroom alone. We suspect that
the great virtue of structuralism is after all the rest that it
gives to fatigued minds. The ledger of being and becoming
for the imagination is never balanced; and in this its activities are like those of life, for we dwell in a world whose
ledgers are never balanced. Everywhere in life it is plainly
written that simplicity is not the essence of being, however
convenient it may be thought. Formal simplicity is after all,
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only relative; but there is another simplicity which successful thinking absolutely requires, and that is simplicity of
functioning. That is, thought must· be capable of that simplicity of movement which leads the mind smoothly from
the virtual world of memory to the real world of things, from
the moral realms of values to the intellectual realm of facts,
the moral realm of values to the intellectual realm of facts,
from the discontinuous world of perception to the continuous
world of deeds. This simplicity imagination possesses; and
our central contention is that epistemology has involved itself
in difficulties, not because it thought about things, but because it thought about thinking; and in so doing, it attempted
to make one device of the imagination preempt the rest of
them. We think that the arch example of this is the attempt
to make reasoning by similarity the exclusive type of all reasoning. But to do this leaves us confronted with the disheartening array of opacities which we have already enumerated. 7 Our only hope of restoring consistency is by restoring
imgaination to its own, capable not only of assimilating the
unknown to the known on the basis of similarity but also of
assimilating the known to the unknown in terms of causality.
Let us see whether we can support our view by the facts.
3
FACT AND VALUE AND IMAGINATIVE THOUGHT

41. Let us consider first the omnipresence of fact and
value in imaginative thought. We may use here Spencer's
principle that the final test of truth is the " inconceivability
of the opposite." But the principle of inconceivability of the
opposite is fraught with both virtues and dangers. It is a
very basic rule of thought, and the Aristotelian principle of
contradiction is but one side of it. The Aristotelian principle
seizes one phase of it, and what we have termed the "principle of progress" seizes the other. The law of contradiction
7

Chapter III, Divisions 53 to 59.
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declares, " This is a truth which we cannot but believe." 8
The principle of progress replies, " Unless we can conceive
the opposite." In imagination, these two principles are
bound together in an ever-moving unity. Imagination at
once creates and obeys this basic law of conceivability. Its
task is to find the balance between discovering and making
truth. The inconceivable is untrue, but only so long as it is
inconceivable. Here we have both rigidity and flexibility at
their height. A most illuminatihg example of its working is
the thinking of the mathematician. His is a unique comhination of freedom and necessity. He may conceive with
all freedom, but must adhere to his conceptions when once
they are made and accepted. Thus, Riemann and Lobachevski
created new geometries by arbitrarily denying the validity
of the axioms which are basic to Euclid's system. It is by
this dual freedom and necessity of procedure that the imagination carries on its work. Imagination is the experimental method par excellence. It obeys a rule of thinking
which is as rigid and as flexible as life itself, at once strong
and yet changing in its devotions. Yet it is a principle which
reveals to us a prime characteristic of the world in which
thought moves. The fact that this manner of thinking ' succeeds ' (in any sense whatever) shows that the world is also
compounded of being and becoming. The labor of conceivability is but the parallel in thought of the fact that we live
in two worlds, a world of fact and a world of value. We
mean, that the presence of this principle of conceivability at
the root of all thinking points to an immutable condition of
existence, namely, that existence and non-existence are both
among the possibilities.
In applying this test of conceivability, the imagination
moves from the temporary rest which is called fact to that
temporary strife which is called inference. The great danger
consists in resting with a given horde of facts forever, as
s Durant Drake, "The Approach to Critical
Critical Realisrn, 1920, London.
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some of those do who take for their measure the law of contradiction without its complement. Franklin, Arago, Galileo,
Copernicus, and Bruno could testify that the principle of
inconceivability of the opposite will find treacherous uses
unless we have a certain humility without which we should
not enter the kingdom of science. That we " cannot _conceive
of the opposite " does not prove that others cannot do so.
Current psychology affords numberless instances of the denial of entities which the intellect is unable to comprehend.
The soul is a myth since no ' structural components ' can be
found for it: this illustrates the tendency of the intellect to
deny what is cannot comprehend. There are truths which,
though they depend on experience, are yet independent of its
amount. Even the validity of a classification in formal logic
does not depend on the exaustive enumeration of the cases it
subsumes.
Mankind is forever pioneering in the universe of thought,
and the successful pioneer at once trusts and distrusts his
own conceptions. Over our thinking hangs an ominous
fortuity, and nowhere is the struggle for existence wager so
relentlessly as in the world of thought. As Plato discerned,
the conflict of ideas is the motif of all history, human and
animal. There is indeed a dialectic of thought, but its neces1:1ity is imposed by the world in which we dwell. How does
this necessity appear in the technique of verbal dialectic?
38. In verbal discourse we employ " terms " as emblems of
meaning; and " terms " when their meanings are analyzed,
turn out to be but the place-names of their temporary rest.
Here the desire for eternal rest which besets our flagging
energies, emerges in the attempt to make one term preempt
the meaning of its opposite. Thus, La Mettrie would fain
have the term machine include all organism; and Hegelianism
would make the machine an idea, and Watson would regard
the idea as a vocalization. The test of success in these attempts is to ask whether our terms are not fraught with
double meaning. For example, we should ask what profits
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it to speak of a machine which 'thinks,' of an 'idea' which
tips the balances, and of a chemical process in the vocal
organs which ' comprehends its own formula.' In all of
such cases we obviously try to make an identity of meanings
which are radically different.
On similar grounds, we argue that fact and value are terms
pointing to utterly different meanings. We cannot, therefore, apply to them the same term. We must be simple in
our terminology but only so simple as we dare to be. The
grim difference between the world that is and the world that
ought to be, is as yet such that it is beyond comprehension
to identify them. Logic has a method of testing the validity
of inferences, but none for the intelligibility of words. We
define words by reference to others; always we are made to
understand by something which is not defined. This is because underneath the inert symbolism of words there is a perpetual evolution of meaning, which words only approximate,
as a zootrope affords but an approximate image of the movements of a dancer. Definition .is, accordingly, an art, half
guided by rule, half guided by intuition. Pascal advised us
to define neither too much nor too little. This all comes to
saying that the dialectic of terms is but the surface expression
of the deft yet unforeseeable dialectic of the imagination.
The concepts employed in lo,gic are meanings just structural
enough to be fixed by a word; 9 but an idea is more than a
structure: it is an individual subject to growth or to decay.
42. Let us consider in more detail what is given and ,what is
made in this world in which imagination moves. The Aristotelian principle of contradiction is that a thing remains
what it is. Red is red: its principle of action upon and our
action upon it remain constant. Yet, if we had this and no
more, we should be living in a non-moral world. That is, if
seeing grar forever precluded the seeing of red and green,
and if this were the same for everything else, then fact and
value would be identical, and thought would have no excuse
0

John Dewey, How We Think, 1910, p. 125.
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for existing, because there would be no invention which it
could achieve. But Aristotle's principle indicates only one
side of the thinking process. Even while we say that a thing
will not change, we endeavor to change it. That is, we apprehend the ' thing ' by a sort of effort, which it constantly
tries to evade. The " fixity " of a thing includes our effort
to hold it "fixed." Moreover, even while we say that the
thing is fixed we prepare to change it, and our success in
doing so is a story which we call evolution. To amplify,
common-sense implicitly takes sense-data as present in the
objects to which they refer. Neo-realism, seeking to make
this into explicit theory, must undertake the difficult task of
showing that incompatible sense-data can characterize the
same object at the same time. Says Mr. Percy Nunn,1° "A
hot body owns at the same time all the hotness that can be
experienced around it." "The buttercup actually owns' as co-ordinate substantive features '-all of the colors that
may be present under different conditions." Holt declares
that the whole world is full of such contradictions. 11 Granting
that the iron will 'own' heat at all (which is already at the
opposite pole from neo-realism) it could own no more than
one temperature since it has but one position with respect
to itself. The buttercup might well ' own ' (in its own
memory, let us say, if it have one) "all the colours which
may be present under different conditions "; the different
'conditions' referred to will be real because time is real.
That is, even the buttercup must distinguish between the
color it does have and the many other ones which it might
have. In vain do we try to erect a monism of being or a
monism of understanding. Neo-realism cannot (and they
do not attempt it) demonstrate that the monism of being
which they defend is either physical or mental.
10 Percy Nunn, Proc. Aristotelian Soc., (N. S.) Vol. X, pp. 197, 203.
See also S. Alexander, Ibid., Vol. X, p. xi.
11 Edwin B. Holt, The New Realism, pp. 364, 370.
See also his The
Concept of Consciousness, Chap. XIII.
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Bertrand Russell essays an escape from the difficulty
arising from the fact that different individuals find different
sense-data in the same object. 12 He maintains that there are
an infinite number of worlds, each of which has a space of
its own. There are as many of these spaces as there are
private percipients; therefore the qualities which pertain to
any one space cannot clash with the qualities found in the
other spaces. But if the perspective, that is, the space, of
each percipient is completely removed from all other spaces,
then no problem arises which needs to be solved by Russell's
subtlety. He first assumes that only one perspective enters
into one awareness, but then assumes this to be somehow
disturbed by the necessity of reconciling what it finds with
the sense-data that belong in other spaces. Difficulty only
arises when we have two subjects, entertaining the same perspective, who yet find a difference of sense quality in the
same thing. How is this difficulty to be solved? We think
that it can never be solved so long as we suppose that the
sense qualities belong to the object and to the subject alone.
The way out is to make use of the fact that these sense-data
are in a sense given to the object by the subject-they represent a certain efficiency which we have acquired in encountering objects. If the normal eye sees red where the color-blind
eye sees gray, there is here no problem of logic, no. problem
as to how incompatiable sense-data can adhere in the same
object. We are here only concerned with a problem of
defect. The eye which sees gray suffers from an insufficirmcy
of vision. The dictum " red remains red " only means, therefore, " red remains red until we are able to make it yield
some other sensation." Thus, even perception follows the
principle of conceivability; and it is this which keeps vision,
for example, forever different from photography. It is imagination which lends its characteristic properties to all living
activities, making of the whole phenomena of growth a unique
prcoess which can never be fully explained in chemical terms
12

Bertrand Russell, Scientific Method in Philosophy, Chicago, 1914.
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so long as chemistry is a science of fixed entities. If we
mount from the sphere of perception to the sphere of memory,
we shall find that imagination exercises its influence in such
a way that it makes memory far more than the 'wax-tablet'
theory can describe.
43. The problem of memory is to understand how its
images can at once denote an object and connote a meaning.
Many psychologists have made attempts to show that some
images are copies of objects and others embodiments of meaning. Some among them have insisted that thought and the
meanings which it involves must be imageless. The debate
concerning imageless thought is one of the most extended and
significant debates in which modern psychology has been involved. To this problem our discussion has led, and in dealing with it we will make use of a valuable summary by
Francis A veling. 13
Galton 14 was the author of the notion that images were
often like composite portraits, and this ingenious notion
attracted the attention of Huxley, Hume, and Binet. Galton
studied the mental content when one thinks of particular and
general terms. He found some observers who testified that
they found nothing in consciousness except the word itself 15
Ribot, however, was the first to offer any considerable study
of imagery. 16 He sought to discover what is in the mind
when we get a general term through some sense mode. Such
terms were presented to observers, who were asked to give
their introspections. Their replies were classified. Thus, he
arrived at a confirmation of the notion of 'types of imagery.'
1 3 Francis Aveling, On the Conscwusness of the Universal and the
Particular, 1912. This volume also contains a history of the concepts
of the universal and the particular in philosophy, and contains a report
of an experimental study made by the author, the chief result of which
is to demonstrate that meaning is not dependent upon imagery.
14 Sir F. Galton, Inquiries into Human Faculty, 1883.
1 5 Sir Francis Galton, Op. Cit., Appendix E.
16 Th. Ribot, " Enquete sur les Idees Generales," Revue Philosophique,
1891, Vol. 32. See also his L'Evolutwn des Idees Generales, 1897.
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But some of his observers found nothing else in consciousness
except the word. Ribot argued that there must be something
else in the mind besides the word, else the word would be
meaningless. He concluded that a ' general idea ' is a word
plus possible imagery plus an obscure unconscious element
which he does not define. This, it may be observed, is a
rather spectaculative vein for one so given to 'positivism '
as was Ribot. But we appreciate the difficulty he was under.
The truth is, we are here engaged with a difficulty which is
as much logical as it is experimental. There is the same
distinction between an image and its meaning that there is
between anything and its meaning. The attempt to identify
imagery and meaning is doomed to failure at the very start.
Marbe's work is important.17 His study of judgment ended
with the conclusion that judgment is a fact that we are aware
of in its own character, not at all as a sensation, not as an
image, nor as a feeling. It possesses imageless content
(Bewusstseinslagen) involving attitudes of consciousness that
are different from perceptions and images. Ach 18 carried
out experiments in the study of will and thought and finds
that his observers report content or knowledge for which there
is no qualitative basis. But he holds that the tendency to
arouse these when an idea is in the mind accounts for the
experience of meaning. This notion is similar to James'
theory of the ' fringe of consciousness.' Watt 19 confirmed
the observations of Kiilpe that the task set for the observer
chiefly affects the nature of his apperceptions; and he concludes also that there are indefinite images that may function
as ' universals,' though he points out that this does not preclude the existence of non-imaginal or general ideas.
17 Francis Aveling, Op. Cit., p. 61.
Cf. K. Marbe, Experimentellpsychologische Untersuchunge,n iiber das Urteil, Laipzig, 1901.
18 Loe. Cit., p. 61, Cf. N. Ach, Uber die Willenstatigkeit des Denken,
Gottingen, 1905.
19 Loe. Cit., p. 65. Cf. Watt, H.J., "Experimentelle Beitriige zu einer
Theorie des Denkens," Arch. f. die ges. Psychologie, Vol. IV, 1905, p. 289.
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Messer, 20 basing his researches upon those of Watt, finds a
'general image.' It is so ill defined that it can stand for a
whole class. But he does not by any means consider either
a particular or a general image as the necessary condition
of understanding. He finds that when a key is given to a
subject, the meaning frequently appears in consciousness
before the word. The work of Buhler 21 on the thought-processes as a whole ends with the conclusion that thought is
mediated by concepts, not by images. His defense of imageless thought is clear and uncompromising. Bovet repeated
the experiments of Marbe, Messer, and Buhler in Geneva in
1908, 22 and defends the general method of research used, and
corroborate their conclusions.
But these Wurzburg psychologists are severely criticised
by Wundt 23 and by Titchener. 24 Von Aster joins them in
their general condemnation of the doctrine of imageless
thought; which is that such thought is beyond ' observation,'
and amounts to an indescribable experience.
Newer studies, however, reaffirm their findings. Moore 25
made a study of abstraction, and among other results, confirms the existence of imageless mental contents. Perception,
he concludes, is made possible by the existence of mental categories to which sense experiences are assimilated. So we
20 Loe. Cit., p. 67.
Cf. A. Messer, "Experimentell-psychologische
Untersuchungen iiber des Denken," Archiv. f. die ges. Psychologie, Vol.
VIII, 1906, p. 1.
21 Loe. Cit., pp. 68-69. Cf. Buhler, "Tatsachen und Probleme zu einer
psychologie der denkvorgange," Archiv. f. die ges. Psychologie, Vol.
VIII, 1907, p. 297; also Vol. XII, 1908, p. 1.
22 Loe. Cit., pp. 68-69.
Cf. P. Bovet, " L'Etude experimentale du
Jugement et de la Pensee," Archives de Psychologie, Vol. VIII, 1908,
p. 9.
23 Loe. Cit., p. 69.
Cf. Wundt, Psychologische Studien, Vol. III, 1907,
p. 301.
24 Titchener, E. B., Lectures on the Experimental Psychology of the
Thought Processes, N. Y., 1909.
25 Moore, "The Process of Abstraction," Univ. of California. Publications, Berkeley, Cal., 1910.
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find this problem of meaning and imagery entering into the
present concerns of psychology but without being solved. 26
44. We have learned that this problem of imageless meaning is ill suited to investigation. Images are prone to appear
when we seek them, and we are left in doubt as to whether
they are ever absent when we think. Let us see. whether
this problem is not more than an experimental one. Let us
suppose for the sake of argument that we never think without the presence of images. Would this fact in any way
account for the notion of generality and of meaning? We
think not. The difficulty is that the image is supposed to be
the copy of a particular object at the very start.
Now, it is possible to derive meaning or generality from
these particular images in one of two ways. First, the image
becomes the symbol or bearer of generality. In this case, the
image itself is not the meaning. What then is the unknown
which we call meaning, and why does it choose a particular
image to bear it? The whole problem of the relation between
mind and things is transferred to the mental realm ~here it
becomes the problem of the relation between meaning and
imagery.
45. The second solution affirms that certain images as such
are general meanings. Their generality is like that of composite portraiture of which Galton speaks. The difficulty is that
the portrait and the 'faded image' taken alone do not reveal
their generality. The portrait might be the very likeness of
some person, none need guess that it is a photograph of
society at large. How then shall we know which images are
the general ones? Is it when we use them as generalities?
1f so, then the image does not give generality to us, but we
give generality to it. Another device is to say that general
images are somewhat faded ones, in which particular fea26 Our review of the literature is only a sketch of the chief results.
To be even a survey, we could not ig,nore the work of Egger, Bain,
~trickler, Stiimpf, Paulhan, Baldwin, Bastian, Collins, Lehmann, Secor,
..11d others.
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tures have dropped out. But in this case, instead of regarding the image as a lordly generality, why do we not consider
it as even less than an individual, perhaps a:s a ghost or an
illusion?
We seem to be struggling here, not with an experimental
difficulty, but with a logical one. We have already accepted
an image as denoting a particular thing and nothing more.
Is it not then rather vain to try to extort from it meaning
and generality which we have already by definition excluded?
We must reconsider our first presumptions regarding the
image. If we begin by declaring that the image is no more
than an 'imitation' of an object, we are still wrong in inferring that therefore an image is no more than a denotation.
In any case, if we accept it as purely denotative, it is futile
to try to extract connotation (meaning) from it. Images
are 'imitations' of objects in some sense, but we must remind
ourselves that objects have a double significance: they are
at once facts and values. The object is the meeting place of
the general and the particular, for fact and value. To state
this same view ontologically, the ' thing ' is the meeting place
for being and for becoming. And if it is the work of perception to portray ' things ' in all their truth, then we will
expect that images, derived from sense, will do the same.
The image too is the meeting place for fact and value, for
particularitly and generality; and the problem here is no
more obscure than it is with the object itself. It is perception
which mediates between ' things ' and the images of them.
Let us consider the phenomena of perception in more detail
in order to untangle the devices by means of which it apprehends at once the generality and particularity of things.
The resemblance of the eye to a camera (made evident by
the classic work of Helmholtz) has led to the stubborn and
persistent notion that vision is· a sort of photography. But
in our opinion, vision, and every other sense process, exhibit characteristics which go far beyond what chemical process is able to explain. In perception there is a vital labor
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which has not a few analogies to thinking. Perception is a
process in which the discovery of resemblances and differences
go hand in hand. If we suppose that perception grasps only
the particulars, we find ourselves involved in both logical and
experimental difficulties. If perception grasps only elementary sensations we make it unable to testify as to the
reality of what it perceives. Titchener demonstrated thisthough not by intention. He attempted to apply to perception
his usual method of analysis, of reducing all phenomena to
their elementary ' components ' or elements. He analyzed
the sensations into attributes of quality, intensity, duration,
clearness, etc. How, then, do these various properties yet
belong to one and the same sensation? Because qu,ality
serves the office of an essence, giving modality to all sensations and serving as a sort of matrix in which the other
properties can adhere. Thus, a sensation becomes an element, and its attributes are 'aspects' or 'sides ' of it.2•
Titchener arbitrarily takes quality as something more than
an 'aspect' of the sensation. To have taken intensity in its
place would have been just as tenable logically. 28 But
Titchener argued that quality serves his purpose best since
it keeps down the number of sensations and their kind. The
substance of a sensation thus turns out to be only an arbitrary
determination, selected because of its systematizing value.
In fact, the 'elementary sensation' itself turns out to be an
entirely subjective concept. It was by similar argument that
Berkeley and Hume arrived at scepticism regarding the
extra-mental existence of things. This criticism has been
urged by Rahn and others. Rahn pointed out that intensity,
27 E. B. Titchener, "Sensation and Its Attributes," Lecture 1 of his
The Psychology of Feeling and Attention, 1908.
2 8 C. Rahn, " The Relation of Sensation to Other Categories of Contemporary Psychology: A Study in the Psychology of Thinking,"
Psychol. Rev. Mono. Suppl., Vol. XVI, 1913, No. 67. Other critics are
Miss Calkins, Psy. Rev., Vol. VI, 1899, No. 5. Ladd and Woodworth,
Elements of Phy.siological Psychology, 1911, p. 302.
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duration, and clearness are relative and therefore necessarily
subjective. They depend on comparison. Titchener refuses
to make a thorough reply to Rahn 29 because Rahn refers to
no works of his later than 1910. Titchener further explains
that he distinguishes between the ' sensation of classification '
and the 'sensation of observation.' The 'sensation of classification ' is the type in which he interests himself as an experimentalist. The various attributes of the experienced
sensation that are found together in experience are 'bracketed' together by the experimenter. But how do we know
that they belong to one and the same thing externally?
Titchener admits that we are able to bracket together only
what we find together in the excitation, and he thus gives excitation the logical preference over ' determination.' We
accept this result, but point out that it amounts to an admission on the part of Titchener that our faith in the existential status of a sensation is verified by immediate experience
only. We have failed to establish the reality of a sensation
by an abstract association of ' components.'
Perception is then this mutual discovery of unity and
multiplicity. Says Bergson, 30 "Generalization can only be
effected by extracting common qualities; but that qualities
should appear common, they must have already been subjected
to a process of generalization.'' Perception is just such a
simultaneous process of association and dissociation. Perception seems passive, but it is really an active process-it involves wMk ... We ' carve ' the things we see out of a confused
world. Otherwise, how could the repetition of a perception
make it clearer? Is it because a second occurrence deepens
the impress on the brain? Then, how is memory able to
separate the two impressions made in the same place, since
it is able to recall each occurrence separately? It appears
that these various impressions are at once added and kept
29 E. B. Titchener, "Sensation and System," Am. J. of Psychol., Vol.
XXVI, 1915, No. 2, pp. 258-267.
30 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, 1911, p. 205.
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separate; and this fact serves to demonstrate that memory
is such that the notion of a wax-tablet explains only one-half
of what memory does; and the same holds true of perception.
Perception and memory are both instruments of the imagination, and it is this fact which renders chemical explanations
of them forever inadequate. Chemical and physical explana~
tions cannot touch the world of becoming in which imagination (and with it, memory and perception) moves. Perception and memory, like imagination, are a kind of thought, as
their role in thinking makes apparent.
46. So far, our description of 'how' the imagination has
divided itself into two distinct functions goes somewhat in a
circle. We say that the imagination has two tasks because
we live ii:t two worlds which oppose each other, the world of
ideals and the world of facts. Our account further holds that
the imagination, and the action which realizes it, causes these
two worlds to telescope enabling us to go from the one to the
other. This assumption of the duality of our experience is
no gratis dictum of ours. That we dwell in a world of being
as distinguished from a world of becoming is a truth forced
upon us by experience. So much is this the case that we
regard a person who makes no distinction between fact and
value, either in thought or in act, as defective. · But there is
another matter which is more open to debate, and this is the
question as to how such a double reality can appear to the
same subject. We have tried to make this clear in our
definition of the imagination and its description; and we have
also tried to show how imagination specializes its processes
without sacrificing its generality of power. We have still a
further difficulty. Just how does imagination gain something
and yet lose nothing by its characteristic fission into formal
and moral modes of thought? How is thought able to solve
problems more efficiently than action?
If in thinking we merely play the drama of life subjectively with only ' copies ' of the particulars with which we
deal in active conduct, it is difficult to see how any advantage
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is possible. This theory of reasoning goes back to associationism and was defended not only by the associonist logicians,
but by such psychologists as Bain, Hartley, and Binet. Will
it be argued that by dealing with images instead of real objects, we are able to avoid the fatal 'trial and error' which
is met with in conduct? But it is quite certain that these
images are less exact than their originals ; and in this case
it would seem that the ' trial and error ' difficulties were only
aggravated when we choose to think rather than to act. To
be sure, such errors will be confined to thought; but thought
must issue in action sooner or later, and then the accuracy
of action will be no greater than the accuracy of thought
which preformed it. Indeed, if thought proceeds only by the
association of images, it has less chance of succeeding than
have the sensori-motor arcs which we assume to govern action,
since the latter are supposed to ' deal ' with the real and unmistakable original objects, with few risks of the errors
which creep into the images of them.
Is thought less subject to error because it can repeat its
trials ad libitum before venturing to act upon them? This
could only be provided the trials were varied for the purpose
of determining the more successful ones. But, it is impossible to say which is successful until all are tested in experience. What is more, if each virtual trial occurs with all the
particular details that the reality will involve, there must be
included the same loss of time and the same effort as in real
experience, since time and effort too are details of a lived
event. In truth, such thinking would have nothing to distinguish it from action itself. Thought can hardly be said
to involve either less or more effort than action, because they
are to a great extent efforts of a different kind. At any rate,
there is no measure of effort except the testimony of menand it appears that most men prefer action to.reflection.
In what, then, does the peculiar advantage of thinking
consist? Is the efficacy of thought due to its utilization of
memory? But action too has its 'memory,' if we mean
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memory of the wax-tablet variety. Tropisms, reflexes, habits,
and instincts are all organic ' memories,' and seem to be both
general and particular, just as the conscious memory seems
to store bot hgeneral and particular ideas. For example, the
heart reflex is particular; it suffices for one particular task
alone. The biceps reflex has a generality which suits it to
countless functions. But we do not regard such functions as
thought. Actually, the beceps reflex is as particular as that
of the heart, it is only to the mind which sees its multiform
uses that its action is generalized. We have rejected the
notion that thinking consists in the association of particulars.
Neither does the unique power of thought consist in its sole
use of general ideas. For one thing, generalities are notably
incapable of informing us · adequately concerning our problems, which are always particular ones. The law of gravity
does not tell us when a given apple will fall: there is an
element of fortuity in every event, which is fortuitious for
the very reason that it has not (perhaps cannot) be
generalized.
If thought is to be successful, it must be both general and
particular at once. To achieve this is the typical work of
the imagination. It makes possible the development of
special structures and functions without sacrificing the
generality of possible development. Imagination has developed formal and moral reasoning as special processes, but
it has done so without permitting either one entirely to lose
the power of the other. Imagination, while it divides things
into numbered parts, retains the general value which binds
them into a common class. This mutual exercise of generalization and particularization is characteristic even of the
lowest forms of thought.
47. No doubt imagery plays a large part in the thinking of
savages and in the thinking of children. 31 But the use of
particular images does not prove that untutored minds are
s 1 Levy-Bruhl, Les Fonctions Mentales dans les Societes lnferieures,
1910.
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capable only of particulah ideas. On the contrary, there is
good reason to think that such a mind employs particular
images partly as symbols for adstractions. The thought of
the scientist differs from this only in degree. He displays a
tendency to greater and greater abstraction, but at the same
time to greater and greater particularity. It is just to the
extent that we can bring some past generality of experience
to bear upon a particular object or event that we are set
free from the fortuity of time. Accordingly, the more abf-tract thinking of the scientist gradually loses the dramatic
and timeful quality of the thinking of the child. Experience
comes more and more to be represented by timeless concepts;
but to the extent that thought is inventive, this timefulness
is not eliminated but only obscured. Thinking, like life in
general, is under two necessities: the necessity of being
efficient, and the necessity of being plastic and invetive. Evolution an dimagination are both under the ·necessity of discharging these two functions. Evolution so resembles imagination in this respect that we suspect that evolution is the
characteristic product of imaginatinve thought. The Spencerian notion of evolution as a progression from the general
to the ·special is utterly untenable. If generality were exhausted, evolution would of necessity come to an end. When
an animal's entire powers are represented by specialized
structures, it has attained, to be sure, ' perfect ' adaptation
to a given situation; but at the same time its powers to adapt
itself to a new situation: (which is what evolution means)
reaches zero. The problem of evolving is the problem of finding the golden mean, the best balance between particularity
of adaptation and generality of power. To maintain both ofl
these functions is the characteristic function of the imagination. It is our aim to show that in all stages of thought,
whether it ·be the thought of the savage, of the scientist, o:r:
of the poet, induction and deduction, association and dissociation, judgments of fact and judgments of value mutually
support each other.
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Primitive imagination is mainly reasoning by analogy. In
it there seems to be nothing of the elaborate induction and
deduction of the scholar. "A child sees in the moon and stars
a mother surrounded by her daughters. The aborigines of
Australia called a book a ' mussel,' merely because it opens
and closes like the valves of a shell-fish." 32 But do these cases
involve reasoning by resemblance alone? We think not, for
there must be present also an active dissociation which leads
to the overlooking of the discrepancies. On the other hand,
there are instances of primitive thinking in which resemblances are suppressed, as when a savage recognizes an individual tribesman by suppressing the resemblances he bears
to all men in general. Elements dissociated have been meddled with by the imagination as surely as elements associated.
Perception and conduct owe unique character to this same
double process of association and dissociation, which it is our
present task to show, holds also for the thinking process
proper.
Let us suppose the case of a child who yesterday suffered
pain as a consequence of putting its finger into the flame of
a candle. Today it sees another flame-and halts a wayward
hand just in time, thanks to yesterday's association between
flame and pain. But we have also to thank a dissociation by
contiguity in time. Today's situation dissociated from yesterday's, and this alone enables the child to use yesterday's experience as a value. Can we generalize from from this and
say th::it the logic of morals ever seeks differences and that
formal logic ever seeks resemblances? First appearances
render the view plausible. Resolving the unknown to the
known on the basis of resemblance is the avowed task of
formal reasoning as expressed in science. The moral reason,
on the other hand, is as stubbornly bent on finding in reality
a virtue or good which the appearances deny. But the relation of imagination to formal and moral logic is generic, and
32

Th. Ribot, Essa.ys on the Creative Imagination, 1906, p. 26.
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in our usage this implies that however specialized formal and
moral logic become, they must still make an implicit use of
what they have sacrificed in order that they may become
what they are. We accordingly expect to find in both formal
and moral reasoning a mutual process of generalization and
particularization. By way of example let us take a simple
case of formal thinking, where questions of value will seem
to be entirely excluded.
48. Imagine, then, a child exercising the elementary power
in arithmetic which we term counting. Here the principle of
Aristotle, that things remain what they are, seems to find a
rigid and exclusive usage. But is there no other principle of
thought operating? We cannot ask, does the child employ
the Aristotelian principle explicitly, and another principle
implicitly, for he succeeds without any theory about the matter at all. It is we who reduce his operations to principles:
and we answer the above question by saying, "Yes, there
enters into this process a principle which goes far beyond
numbers themselves,. and far beyond the principle of Aristotle. We refer to the unconscious assumption of the child
ihat he can continue to count. The child counts by successive
acts· of attention, but the number of these acts will always be
finite. From whence, then, comes his conviction that he can
count or could count indefinitely? " We have," said Poincare, 33 "the faculty of conceiving that a unit can be added
to a collection of units; thanks to experience, we have occasion to exercise this faculty and we become conscious of it ;
but from this moment we feel that our power has not limit
and that we can count indefinitely, though we have never had
to count more than a finite number of objects." Poincare
suggests the origin of this infinity of nu:mber: it is due to
that part of our nature which is able to conceive of the infinite repetitions of an act. Counting therefore involves a
paradox. We count to exhaust the class of things we are
33

Poincare, Henri, Dernieres Pensees, 1913, p. 21.
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counting, and yet we conceive that our arithmetic extends to
infinity. But this is a pararlox only so long as we think that
the Aristotelian principle is the only one involved in reasoning. Experience belies it, for in experience no matter how
much we count, always something remains over. What this
' something ' is, is more than arithmetic can tell: that art
only knows what is has counted already. As Renouvier observed, 34 the number series, 1, 2, 3, 4, etc., does not reach an
infinite number. Consequently, anything numbered must
always exist in finite amount. Only the possibility of counting
is infinite. But is this unending possibility due to a certain
potency of human nature alone? No, for thought is moulded
on things, and our minds could not think the possibility of
counting as being infinite if there were not in nature a certain
inexhaustible richness which permits it. But those who wish
to make arithmetic into metaphysics, i.e., those who have the
Pythagorean notion that the universe is a universe of numbers only, must require that the parts of the universe that
have so far escaped the mathematical inventory of science is
still given in finite amount. James very justly points out 35
that all science may legitimately require of the universe is
that nothing should be lacking. It is not even true to say
that the counted things are limited: the things we count are
limited only in the sense that we conventionally accept them
as such. A tree is 'one' object only when we are counting
trees; but the moment we change our point of view, we may
regard the tree as a fraction of a larger unit or as a constellation of innumerable atoms. In truth, it is only our
counting itself that is ' limited,' not the things counted.
Every object we count is a unit because we are at the time
satisfied with it as such. But our imagination, ever restless,
does not even permit an atom to remain ' one,' strenuously
as we ma yassume this while we are quantifying nature.
Every number, in fact, is at once a unity and multiplicity.
34

35

William James, Some Problems of Philosophy, 1911, p. 162.
Idem., p. 162.
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Arithmetic can show us how to count, but not when to cease
counting. This latter knowledge is given us by our purposes,
by the goals toward which we strive. Thus, even the child
of our illustration exercises two faculties in his arithmetic.
He reasons in terms of the ' imitation ' of similars, but the
similars he counts, and how many of them is determined by
his moral sense. Just as a buyer in the market place counts
the money he intends to pay in .exchange for the goods he
receives. He not only counts, but counts a specific amount,
and this amount is a value subject to judgments to which the
counting itself is not subject. The price of the goods may
be 'fair' or unjust, but with this the mere number of the
coins paid has nothing to do. It is indifferent whether we
say that the goods is paid for with several dollars or several
hundreds of cents. Here formal and moral thinking cooperate without quarreling. It is only when we become conscious of our mental processes, when we think about thinking,,
that difficulties arise. To the child, the principle of contradiction and the principle of progress operate unawares in
his thought. It is only when we become aware of the operation of principles of thought that the difficulties of metaphysics arise. Is not imagination here seeking to know what
it can and what it cannot do? This is an issue which has
momentous ·consequences: the issue as to whether or not
formal reasoning is adequate to all problems is a crucial issue
in this age of exact science; and in fact in the history of
ideas which underlies all history, this issue has been many
times fought.
It is not wholly true that in normal imaginative thinking
formal logic takes care of particularity, and that moral ideas
provide unity in1 terms of the unity of goals. Generality and
particularity appear together in both facts and values. The
unity of number is the unity of some value which gives a
common character to its members. But is value once and
always unitary? No, for in moral reasoning they become
explicitly plural. That is, in moral thinking we do not count
137
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similarities of things, but their differences, because each
difference represents a virtue which we dare not neglect.
The intellect posits a universe of being, and deals democratically with all things in terms of quantity and number. But
moral reason does not ask, " How many books exist and
what is their total quantity in weight?" It seeks rather tq
learn the multiform good and evil effects of particular books,
and holds that this is the matter which should determine
their number. But to achieve this, counting is still necessary
-necessary in order to determine the labor it will take to
destroy the bad and create the good. That is, for action,
quantity and number are values.
49. Let us consider further the special case of a class of
enumerated objects., Their classification rests upon one or
more traits which they have in common. This principle of
unity will be a value of some kind, other than quantity. To
be sure, in mathematics we have classes of numbers: the
class of rational as contrasted with the irrational numbers,
or the integers as contrasted with the fractions. Here it will
seem that we have objects forming a class with no other
properties whatever except that of quantity. Can quantity
as such be a principle of the unity of a class? Mathematics
is drawn from experience and is a powerful instrument in
guiding it. What is the psychology of its success if it does
not employ a value of some kind as the basis for its classifications? We think that the mathematician does introduce
values as the basis of his classification as follows : If his
units are really enumerated, if he writes, 1/10, 2/10, 3/10,
etc., here are vital realities, each one representing an act of
attention and a movement. It is by such finite increments
that he hopes to arrive at the number one which is more than
a quantity-it is a goal and therefore a value, at which he
arrives just as we arrive at home by so many discrete steps.
Now, the classes of numbers are just such' homes' or beacons,
or havens of rest, to which the mathematician directs hiB
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endeavors. These quantities are values because they are the
milestones of human effort.
The ' tristram Shandy paradox ' may serve as an illustration to make clear what we mean. Tristram Shandy took two
years to write the biography of the first two days of his life.
Can we conclude that at this rate the biography will ever
be completed? Bertrand Russell 36 thinks that it can (supposing the author to be immortal). Since the days and years
have no last term, he argues, any assigned day will be written
about, a:hd no part of the life remain unwritten. But, as
James points out, the first price of an infinite attainment is
that of never becoming weary of an impossible task. Russell
is right in hypothesis, if we neglect the reality of time and
fatigue. But even counting takes place in time, and this
leaves a chasm between Tristram Shandy's life and his autobiography which obliges us to say that there will always be
years of his life which are not written.
What ~dvantage is gained by erecting quantities into
artificial goals of endeavor in the science of mathematics?
There is gained a generality of power. The real spaces in
which we move and with which we are familiar, under the
survey of practiced eyes and the motor mechanisms which
they control, will fall into various cut-and-dried paths of
movement, each of which forewarns us of the number and
kinds of tensions which will be required to traverse it. Now,
the virtue of mat_hematics is that it frees imagination from
the thraldom to habit. The realm of numbers are a veritable
field of ' anyness," as Carus called it, in which the energy
of our acts may be infinitely small and delicate and may
traverse the strange spaces of hyper-Euclidean geometry.
Imagination is ever engaged in achieving means of progress
which a custom-ridden habit declares 'irrational.' 'Number '
is the most democratic evaluation that we can give to things.
When we merely count things, we give each of them an equal
36

Wm. James, Some Problems of Phi'.losophy, 1911, p. 183.
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status of reality: this again frees us from that bias of moral
reason which has credited each thing with a particular virtue.
But number alone is too democratic: so democratic that
arithmetic alone does not tell us how far to subd1vide the
world when we count. If simplicity is the only virtue, then
why count beyond the five continents and the five seas? But
here the moral sense intervenes, and would carry things to
the opposite extreme: forbidding that the stom be indivisible
and demanding that number be infinite. The ordinary integers serve nearly all exigencies of our daily life, but the
mathematicians have been driven to imagine minute fractions
between them, and between these threads of irrational numbers. What does this mean other than that in the moral
~phere no quantity can be so small that it is not forth counting. So also mathematical space eternally falls spart into
new points. Is this in obedience to any other demand than
the restless importunity of a spirit which, like Maxwell's
demons, would leave no other position of the universe unaffected by its will? In action, we find a compromise, and the
' objects ' with which we deal represent our compromise between unity of quantitative being and the infinite uses to
which we would put it if we could. The number ' one ' with
which we christen the object, itself wavers between absolute
unity and infinite divisibility. We must think of the imagination functioning by a succession of tensions (and we surmise
that this has its counterpart in the mechanism of the mind's
control over the body). What is gained in this process? A
working balance between special efficiency of function and
generality of adaptation. The intellect posits a universe of
mere being accountable in terms of quantity and number.
Here is at once generality and particularity, as much of each
as we please. Here is generality of power, for when all things
are reduced to the generality of being, we gain by the sacrifice
of all form, a maximum of potentiality. Upon this as a
flexible medium, the imagination can exercise itself, free from
all conventions of habit and custom. We too often think of
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the notions of space and matter as poverty-stricken and drab
images. On the contrary, the points of space and the atoms of
matter permit a constructive ingenuity to which there is no
ideal limit. It is here that we build up in fancy that ideal
good which we hope some day to build in concrete form.
Thus, the highly differentiated function of formal and moral
logic reflects the infinite growth of our moral ideals.
So in moralizing, each good is final and absolute for the
individual acts which realize it. Ideals are goals for our
endeavor: this is their general function. Most general of all
is the good, which as a goal is not concerned with particulars.
It represents a "purposing which goes on forever." 37 Yet,
each goal is attained by a series of numbered steps: these
are the purposes "which come and go."
50. In our consideration of the imagination up to this
point we have given a too exclusive consideration to mathematics, at the expense .of formal logic. We take the two as
the type examples of formal reasoning, and would emphasize
the point made by Russell that logic is but the youth of
mathematics. Its attempt to attain maturity is well evidenced by Russell's own symbolic logic. . The similarity of
formal logic to mathematics is a point that will not go undisputed, and we will consider it first. Then, we will examine
anew our general principle that special forms of thinking
have developed from imagination. If formal logic is the
product of such a growth, the proof will be in its inability
to get along without the capacities it has abandoned. That
is, we shall find in formal logic that fact and value are inseparable, though value be suppressed for the sttke of the
syllogism, just as in mathematics it is suppressed for the
sake of counting. We shall expect to find judgment, like
number, at once analytic and synthetic.
As regards the formal status of logic, we would qualify
Russell's statement by saying that logic is destined to remain
37
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the "youth of mathematics," unless it is to give up a very
crucial difference which separates them. This point of separation appears clearly between a logical and a mathematical
class. The mathematical class, as we saw, has as its uniting
prindple the notion of quantity, though value is implicit in it.
On the other hand, the members of a logical class are explicitly united by some definite qualities or properties. The
mathematician escapes a difficulty which particularly harasses
logic, that is the problem of nominalism. · In mathematics we
seemingly find it easy to take a number as at once singular
and plural: but we showed that this is not actually the case.
Given the digit 'one' for example, it can be a plurality only
on the condition of its divisibility, but this involves expectation and savors of value. If we have the fractional parts of
the number one given, we attain to oneness by a similar process of introducing the notion of value, this time the number
one will be a goal. May it be said that there are other types
of mathematical classes whose membership is differently constituted than by this part and whole idea? But since all
numbers are quantities, the only device by means of which
we can divide them into sub-classes is to take advantage of
the fact that some have certain qualitative traits which distinguish them. Finite numbers are thus distinguished from
transfinite numbers, and the rational from the irrational
numbers which are beyond all finite limits, greater than all
finite numbers. We can see that the distinction here depends
on the introduction of the notion of time-transfinite numbers
are actually infinite; for them, the possibility of continuing
to count still further does not exist. Similarly, irrational'
numbers were invented to solve a certain ' timeful ' difficulty
that arises in the case of ordinary fractions. Between two
rational fractions, for example, 1/lOth and 1/llth there is
a gap, but a gap which can never be filled by inventing other
rational fractions between them. So, the mathematician conceives that there are other 'irrational' fractions with the
peculiar power which enables them to bridge these gaps with-
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out the infinite vista of time which is required for rational
numbers to brdge these gaps. Thus, the distinction between
finite numbers and transfinite numbers is not a distinction of
quantity, but a distinction of quality, the difference between
finite and infinite goals. The same can be said of the distinction between rational and irrational numbers.
We make use of similar notions when we distinguish the
real quantities of space which we number. Consider weight
and volume as types of quantity. If they were quantities of
the same kind then we should get the true quantity of a body
by adding weight to volume. But instead we divide weight
by volume. Nothing could have taught us to do this except
that unique balance, the muscular system which measures
quantity by its intensity, by its resistance to effort. This
intensity of effort is determined by the lapse of time in which
it occurs: so that a body of great volume will not have the
same intensity as a smaller one of the same weight, since
the space it covers requires us to apply effort at more points
or else to distribute them more in time. Far from dealing
with pure quantity as such, we are here already in the midst
of a drama, replete with values and choices.
51. The entities which ordinary logic classifies have other
properties besides their sheer substance. One or more of
these characteristics may serve as the basis for a classification, but each one of them nevertheless retains the characteristics of substance not considered in making the classification.
Hence arises the problem of realism versus nominalism. Is
the class real, or is it only a name? How does it grasp the
realism of its members without destroying them? How can
a universe which means no particular thing, mean anything
at all? The debate, realism versus nominalism, arises because we create an antithesis between knowledge and things.
We take knowledge to be the unchanging, that is, the general
or the universal properties of things. The particular we segregate in the material world. Matter and knowledge thus appear utterly different, and we decide for the reality of the
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one or the other according to our temperament and training.
We believe either in the reality of general ideas or in the
reality of particulars. Our view is that the truth is somewhere between these extremes. We do not think that the
world of things monopolizes particularity, nor that concepts
monopolize generality. We think that there is ageneral firsttruth about the universe which the first glow of thought must
have discerned: namely, that existence is indeterminate.
Ours is at once a world of being and becoming: a world
which is, and yet a world which may be augumented or which
may perish. It is the function of the imagination to portray
so certain and yet so uncertan a universe. It has specialized
its task, evolving the intellect to take account of the world
that is, and the moral reason for dealing with the problem of
transforming it. But these two manners of reasoning must
not lose sight of each other, and we think that the notions of
generality and of individuality in logic, rightly understood,
will throw much light on their cooperation.
There is a certain generality and particularity about things
already, and the same can be said of concepts. Things have
in common the property of reality. Their indubitable claim
to this is their power to affect us. This it is which has led
philosophers to ascribe to them substances, and this is the
meaning of matter in science. But they affect us in particular ways and at different loci in space. This constitutes
their particularity. So far, we have described an object as
a fact, as a datum of experience; and we find that its factual
status is at once general and particular. Between this
generality of substance and the particular properties which
it yields, there is a genetic relation. The matter, the sub 1
stance, is the source of of unique properties which we may;
find in it in the future. Thus the visual impression which we
call 'gray ' may in time divide into two properties, yellow
and blue, and yellow in time yields red and green. What is
the value status of an object? Its present phenomenal properties are specific values now. But it has also a general
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value, constituted by its ' substance ' which may in time give
rise to new phenomena. But the instant we take the point
of view of an evolved future, the substance of a thing is the
F-pecific thing about it, while its accidents or 'phenomenal
properties ' seem to exhibit potentiality. This latter point of
view is that of rationalism, while empiricism looks at phenomena from the point of view of the present. The difference
between the two philosophies resolved to a difference of point
of view, and it is a difference which is determined by the concept of time. The rationalist considers nature as if all time
had already flown, and to him substance will seem to preempt
the realm of being and ' accidents ' or appearances the realm
of becoming. From the point of view of the present, however,
it is the appearances which are real, and substance which is
the source of becoming. The truth is somewhere between
these views. We shall find these views reconciled in imaginative thought, which takes account of the two points of
view at once. Imagination, like conduct, moves in a medium
of time in which past, present, and future maintain an
organic unity. It reasons in terms of both fact and value,
and carries on the work of generalization and particularization at the same time. In it, the principle of similarity anq
the principle of causality are in harmonious cooperation, just
as they are in the realm of deeds, where we note resemblances
even while we prepare to destroy them.
4
EMBODIMENT OF TIME IN THE IMAGINATIVE LIFE

52. William Jams somewhere observes that the philosopher
is one who is astonished at the commonplace. In truth, it is
the commonplace which is enveloped in the greatest mystery.
The pull o fgravity which we never escape is the eternal
puzzle of physics; while that very mainstay of life which we
call matter is still a stranger to chemistry. We seem to find
anchorage on a stable foundation of matter, yet it is against
this very influence that we constantly struggle. Most baf-

145

104

The Concept of Duration

fling of all is the mystery of knowledge which represents
itself as knowing nothing of this struggle, but which is nevertheless able to guide us aright when we engage in it.
Immediate experience too is engaged in a perpetual problem, but its problem is not a purely formal one. In it we exercise a double form of comprehension: we think at once in
terms of forms and of ideals, and this constitutes imaginative
thought. Imagination is immediate experience became articulate, and so near experience is it, that the borders of the
two constantly overlap. Imagination brings us nearest to
that contact between spirit and matter which is of prime
concern at once of the active and the reflective life. Immediate experience leads us to see that our world is compounded of two ingredients, seemingly aline to each other
but both familiar to us. These ingredients we have called
fact and value. All that we call the sweat and toil of life, its
fortunes and its mischances, constitute the conditions upon
which we may mediate between the world of fact and the
world of value. Time and labor are the prices which we pay
for this transformation.
But formal concepts and motives play each an indispensable
v.art in this process. Our motives discern goals, but formal
concepts designate for us the means of their attainment. It
is the business of conceptual thought to place at our disposal
a mass of knowledge gleaned from the past, and this knowledge is timeless to the degree that it frees us from the fortuity
of time. Formal concepts present to us that which we may
most inevitably expect from nature. It is the function of
formal reason to keep informed about the world of being.
Moore 38 well compares the canons of reasoning to intellectual
habits, slowly developed because of our contacts with a relatively static material world. The postulate of the uniformity
of nature is but an inveterate expectation with which we
approach the world. One selects his own hat from a number
3 8 A. W. Moore, Pragmatism and Its Critics, 1910.
discussed in detail in Chapter XL
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of them. Here the law, "All things remain what they are,"
is wholly tacit. The Aristotelian principle is but this same
habit becomes articulate. Habit is notorious for its inability
to achieve a new act which is not already in its repertoire.
Where there is a unique problem, habit can only tell us the
way in which we cannot solve it. Suppose we reach for an
object only to find that it is an image reflected in a mirror.
In this case the habit of reaching only leaves us with the
realization that we have failed. So also the syllogisms of
formal logic tell us only when we reason wrongly. We make
use of an inveterate mental habit for going from one premise
to another, just as we reach for an object always with the
same rectilinear movement.
But this habit of reaching cannot assure us that the object
for which we reach is indubitably real, and that it is not a
virtual image; and neither does the syllagism tell us whether
the judgments it employs are true. Of course, we commonly
deal only with real objects and ordinarily make inferences
only from true judgments; but here is just the difficulty:
this is true only commonly. Uniformity is but part of nature;
and therefore there are aspects of experience with which
habits and syllogisms cannot cope. As Poincare declared,
"To wish to comprise nature in science would be to want to
put the whole into the part." 39 The very realism of life depend son this unstable and unshifting aspect of the universe.
If the world were indeed guaranteed an uncorrupted and
eternal existence then habit would be adequate to all problems
of action. But if a habit is a mechanical mode of adjustment, as it is currently defined, then 'adaptation' would
appear to go on without consciousness. Of course, in this
case, 'adaptation' would cease to have any meaning. In
such a world all logical problems (if we grant that they
could even arise) might be solved by those logical machines
which savants have invented for their amusement. But habits
are never entirely mechanical as is proved by the fact that
39

Henri Poincare, The Value of Science, 1907, p. 4.

147

106

The Concept of Duration

they are subject to the process of learning. Habits too deal
with a world of becoming. The intellectualist has sought to
make immediate experience articulate, and he has supposed
that to achieve this finalism is required. But his mechanical
syllogisms are not thought for the same reason that a mechanical habit is not conduct. Mechanical action and mechanical thought are by definition effortless and unconscious,
and by these tokens timeless. Real thought and real conduct
are quite different: they are laborious and dramatic in
character. Habits and the figures of the syllogism are useless
unless we are able to apply the right habit or the right
syllogism at the right time. Habit and thought are under a
similar want, the want of converting a real into an ideal
world. We cannot say that they are under a necessity of
reconciling fact and value, unless we understand this neces~
sity in a unique sense. It must be not a logical necessity but
a felt necessity, a necessity which attracts us. That is, our
free choice to pursue truth is prior to the ' logical necessity '
of getting truth according to the rules. Allegiance to the
pursuit of truth, the spirit of science, like- every true allegiance is of the volunteed variety: our allegiance to ideals is
a bond which we ourselves establish. But there is another
bond which is ' necessary ' in an ontological sense: this
necessity, forced upon us after we have forced values upon
ourselves, requires us to pay for every value attained and by
a price of labor and waiting. All consciousness of time is
conditioned by this factor: the sense of time exists only
where there are goals upon which our hopes and efforts can
converge. And the realism of time and of labor inhere in
the fact that our labor and our waiting may be in vain.
These matters are commonplace to immediate experience and
to imagination. The expenditures of effort and the risks of
chance are brute necessities which conduct and thought never
escape, provided they have already accepted the challenge of
ideals. This all comes to saying that if we choose to live, we
can live only under this minimum condition, namely: that
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we accept a certain discontent with the conditions of life.
The infinitely diverse deeds and thoughts of lifetime have
yet one quest in common, to discover that which is the most
constant and also to discover how the constant may be transformed. Even the turnip must have a slumbering discontent
with its state; only this saves it from being mere clay. To
be sure, the choice of life itself is reversible, but the suicide
chooses also to sever his allegiance to ideal causes which his
life might further. What is unescapable and onotologically
necessary is the labor and chance of living, once we have
accepted life as worth while.
53. But imagination has a unique way of dealing with this
necessity. Like a good general, it accepts the conditions of
combat; that is, it begins by conceiving the real and the ideal
world in their fullest opposition. Formal and moral reasoning
constitute acts of acceptance of the duality of the world in
which we live. But in this sharp separation of the world
which is real from the world which is ideal, time and labor,
whch just now united these worlds in action, seem to vanish.
Perfect ideality is only infinitely possible, and the infinite
cannot be attained by steps which occupy finite moments of
time. The finite and the infinite become different in kind;
and we cannot mount to the infinite by multiplying the finite.
Time and effort seem incapable of mediating these worlds.
It is just this initial act of the imagination which we believe has been misunderstood, and it is this which has given
rise to most of the puzzles of epistemology. This opposition
of the conserved material reality to pure possibility may be
interpreted in two ways. Either it is an acceptance of the
challenge of life in the severest form in which it can be conceived, or else they constitute judgments on the nature of
reality. In the first case, the opposition of pure fact to pure
value is but the first movement of thought. But we are
tempted to take this first movement of thought for its last.
Reason begins by positing the universe as given once for all,
but it has already made preparation for changing the universe

a
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in this very assumption; for it insists that the givenness is
in infinitely small particles, and it is this which enables the
'given' universe to be so plastic. The world is given 'once
for all' says the intellect, but it says this with the proviso
that the size of its particles and the positions which they may
occupy are not given once for all. Hence, that perfectly
rigidity and perfect -plasticity of the world with which science
deals. The concepts of the exact sciences are crowde dwith
dramatic elements in spite of their explicit avowal of their
timelessness. This is evident in the classic paradox of
science, the calculus of probabilities. The phrase is itself a
paradox, for a true calculus should admit of no probabilities:
it should only give certainties.
The events of experience will not yield a perfect calculus
no matter how carefully we observe their frequencies. That
is, real events never quite ' fit' the curve of mathematical
chance which alone represent a perfect calculus. The chance
occurrences of our experiences only approximate uniformity
of frequencies. If we toss coins, the requirement of a perfect
calculus would be that the chance of ' head ' or ' tail ' be equal.
But we only approximate this equality in experience. Even
if we are fortunate enough to find one hundred tosses resulting equally divided between the two possibilities, we are beset
with the doubt lest even this may be an accident, which more
tosses may confirm or deny. Suppose we forsake experience
and try to attain a perfect calculus in theory. But we still
find that the difficulty pursues us, for we will be confronted
by a barrier in our own logic. The difficulty with experience
was, that it did not tell us where and when the particular
events would occur which we are seeking to reduce to a calculus. And to renounce experience is but to transfer this
same difficulty to the rational plane: for the law of chance
fails to tell us just where the particulars will occur that substantiate the law. Certainly a probability of one-half does
not free us from the fortuity of time. It should only do so
perfectly when, for example, tossing the coin we should find
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that it yielded half heads and half tails each throw, which is
an absurdity. Even if we possessed a coin which never
failed to turn up heads and tails in perfect alternation, it
would violate the law of chance one-half of the time. In this
case, the notion of a perfect calculus is satisfied only when
we know we are going to toss the coin again, but this is a
matter which the calculus itself cannot fortell. In short, the
one thing which always resists the power of the calculus is a
certain fortuity of time which is expressed not only in nature
at large, but especially in the activities of the human will.
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